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Abstract:
The application of the scientific method to the study of behavior has gone
beyond the realm of philosophy and psychology, requiring modern neurosci-
entists to understand neurobiology, statistics, and even computer science.
Neurobiology explains that neural systems in all animals, including humans,
were evolved to meet specific environmental demands in order for the organ-
ism to survive, mate, and produce viable offspring. However, the complexity
of studying behavior in natural environments has forced neuroscientists to
construct reduced artificial environments where human and non-human an-
imals alike can be trained to respond to calibrated stimuli. For example, a
conventional approach to investigate thresholds for discrimination of 2 dis-
tinct stimuli has been to ask subjects to press one of two buttons according
to the identity of the presented stimulus.
In order to study the process of committing to a choice from online be-
havior, in this thesis we expand the standard 2-choice psychophysical task,
replacing the traditional two response buttons by an arena that must be
traversed in order to reach one of two distally separated targets. This mod-
ification and the use of time-varying stimuli to signal the correct target
allowed us to observe that difficult choices can elicit complex choice trajec-
tories that meander between the two targets in a stimulus correlated manner.
We show that this behavior is also performed by a reinforcement learning
agent that moves in order to maximize long term rewards while considering
movement and time constraints. The agent estimates what she believes to
be the correct target by accumulating stimulus evidence, and subtracts from
the associated reward for answering correctly a cost for moving and a cost
for waiting. The resulting cost function eventually commits the agent to a
target, with the peculiar behavior that, when time allows, the agent changes
her direction as her belief crosses belief thresholds. We also that show that
these bounds on the agent’s beliefs explicitly depend on the movement and
time costs. We interpret the choice trajectories displayed by the human and
the model to be sequences of hesitant choices (crossing soft or reversible
decision bounds) in the process of committing to a final choice (crossing a
hard or irreversible decision bound).
v
Resumo:
Para estudar o processo de compromisso com uma escolha, nesta tese, ex-
pandimos a tarefa psicofísica convencional de 2 opções, substituindo os dois
botões de resposta tradicionais por uma arena que deve ser percorrida para
alcançar um dos dois objetivos distalmente separados. Essa modificação e
o uso de estímulos que variam no tempo para sinalizar o objetivo correto
nos permitiram observar que escolhas difíceis podem desencadear trajetórias
complexas de escolha que serpenteiam entre os dois objetivos de maneira
correlacionada ao estímulo. Mostramos que esse comportamento também
é realizado por um agente simulado que aprende por reforço, que se move
para maximizar recompensas de longo prazo, considerando as restrições de
movimento e tempo. A agente calcula o que ela acredita ser a meta correta,
acumulando evidências de estímulo e subtrai da recompensa associada por
responder corretamente um custo de deslocamento no espaço e um custo de
espera. A função de custo resultante acaba comprometendo o agente com
um objetivo, com o comportamento peculiar de que, quando o tempo per-
mitir, o agente muda de direção à medida que sua crença cruza os limites
da crença. Também mostramos que esses limites ás crenças do agente de-
pendem explicitamente dos custos de movimento e tempo. Interpretamos
as trajetórias de escolha exibidas pelo humano e o modelo como sequências
de escolhas hesitantes (cruzando limites de decisão reversíveis) no processo
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2.6 Response Times for subject 1 (left) and subject 2 (right). ILD
Conditions is defined as the bin centers of the histogram of
experienced ILDs with 6 equal bin sizes used to compute the
psychometric curves of 2.5. The exact values of ILD condi-
tions can vary between the subjects. Response times appear
to decrease as the ILD conditions become easier (darker col-
ors), however, the trend is only significant for subject 1’s left
sided responses. Error bars show standard deviations. . . . . 30
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across the trial) for subject 1 (left) and subject 2 (right).
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shows linear fit with negative weights for both subjects in-
dicating that the Trajectory Length decreases with increas-
ing mean absolute ILD (decreasing difficulty), p<0.001. For
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in the brain of embodied agents
HIGHLIGHTS
• In this first chapter we do a literature review concerning the
study of behavior, and introduce the field of psychophysics.
• We review the literature on role of the brain in mediating
perception and decision-making behavior.
• We present a summary on the use of computational models
in the field of decision making.
• We introduce the literature on models of embodied decision
making and begin to argue that studying the motor compo-
nent of a decision might lead to more accurate models of the
types of problems facing animals making naturalistic choices.
• We motivate the need for a novel task to study online behav-
ior during the decision period, and summarize the literature
on the topic.
• We outline the aims of this thesis and provide a summary of
each chapter.
1
1 Introduction: Decision making in the brain of embodied agents
Contents
1.1 Philosophy and the study of behavior
How should we behave? Some of the most inquisitive minds throughout
history have attempted to ground their philosophical inquiries into human
behavior on pure fictions, such as the presumed desires of one or many Gods.
Such fictions remained unchallenged until the invention of scientific thinking,
which provides a method for testing hypotheses. Major discoveries achieved
through scientific thinking have compelled modern philosophers to integrate
into their theories of behavior knowledge from various fields such as logic,
sociology, and more recently evolutionary biology and neurobiology. Scien-
tific thinking is rooted in a tradition of skepticism owing greatly to Socrates
and his student Plato, founder of the Academy of Athens in ca. 387 BC.
Plato lectured on the nature and purpose of all things, including man, re-
lying on an ideal heavenly construct where the perfect Forms of all things
exist. According to Plato, these perfect Forms project their perfect qualities
to imperfect images or shadows that compose the reality we live in. Every
man is an imperfect physical shadow which borrows his qualities from the
perfect qualities of the true, perfect man that exist as an idea in the realm of
Forms. Our senses are able to directly experience only the imperfect shadow
reality, but inferences about the perfect Forms can be made by studying the
qualities of the imperfect world through repeated sensory observations and
philosophical inquiry. However wrong Plato’s premises about the realm of
Forms were, his conclusions on the importance of repeated sampling and
philosophical reasoning changed the course of history. Plato’s students in-
cluded Aristotle, who - among many other seminal achievements - described
a general framework for constructing logical arguments. The remarkable feat
of Aristotle’s logical argument is that if one’s premises are right, and deduc-
tion is applied thereafter, one should arrive at true conclusions every time.
Aristotle’s famous argument, “Socrates is a man. All men are mortal. There-
fore, Socrates is mortal” demonstrates the basic form of what he called a
“perfect” syllogism, because no further premises are needed in order to make
the conclusion follow the premise. This systematic mode of logical inference
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eventually evolved into our modern recipe for rejecting false hypotheses in
order to discovery the truth, the scientific method [Garvey, 2012].
1.1.1 Philosophy of mind
In the first half of the 15th century, René Descartes wrote his Meditations on
First Philosophy, in which he remarks that that nearly everything he believes
has come to him from his senses. However, soon after this assertion comes
his most famous phrase, “Having thought carefully about it, and having
scrupulously examined everything, one must then, in conclusion, take as
assured that the proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true, every time I
express it or conceive it in my mind” [Descartes, 1998] in which Descartes
discards the senses on account that they sometimes deceive us, for example
when we dream and sense things that are not real. Descartes’ Meditations
did much more than proving his own existence, or at least the existence of
his thoughts, his proposition that all knowledge enters the brain through the
senses set the stage for empirically based knowledge. Unlike Plato’s perfect
Forms, the senses can be investigated through empirical observation. Since
Descartes, other philosophers like Voltaire, Locke and Hume have given the
senses and the perceptions and the subjective experiences they convey a
center stage in their attempts to provide a foundation of knowledge. David
Hume in fact boiled down the very identify of a person to perception alone
when he wrote, “For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I
call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of
heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch
myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything
but the perception” [Hume, 1817]. He concludes that any idea of a self is
a philosophical delusion. Rather than make a case for or against David
Hume’s views on perception as the centerpiece of reality, this thesis assumes
the importance of studying sensory perceptions, and focuses in particular on
the investigation of decisions made upon them.
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1.2 Psychophysics: Relating sensation to phys-
ical stimuli
Studies on the human mind continued to take the form of philosophy, at-
tempting to tackle consciousness and the fabric of reality itself long after
Hume. An argument could be made that all of that philosophy and even
modern science doesn’t have much to add to Hume’s description of conscious-
ness as sequences of perceptions. However, a major breakthrough in the
study of behavior and the mind itself occurred when rather than describing
qualitatively exactly what consciousness is, and attempting to apply logic to
those descriptions, the field of psychophysics began to quantitatively relate
the subjective experience of a sensation to the physical stimulus that cause
it. The earliest examples of this type of study date back to Ernst Heinrich
Weber’s 1830s experiments on sensation and touch [Weber, 1834]. Weber
was able to compute the minimum change in stimulus intensity between two
distinct stimuli required to elicit two physically discernible percepts (the just
noticeable difference, jnd). Weber’s results inspired Gustav Theodor Fech-
ner to develop new methods to measure the jnd across several modalities,
resulting in what he called the Weber-Fechner law, “In order that the in-
tensity of a sensation may increase in arithmetical progression, the stimulus
must increase in geometrical progression” [Fechner, 2007]. This relationship
can be written mathematically as, S = K / ln I, where I is the intensity
of the sensation, S is the strength of the stimulus and K is a constant that
depends on the type and sensory modality of the stimulus. The Fechner-
Weber law provides near perfect approximations of the relationship between
stimulus and sensation, with a few exceptions, most notably when stimulus
energy is so small that it is at the threshold of being consciously experi-
enced. Fechner’s Element de Psychophysik was published in 1860, marking
the birth of the new field of psychophysics [Fechner, 2007]. A key concept
in psychophysics is in fact that of a sensory threshold. A sensory threshold
is defined as the “smallest amount of stimulus energy required to produce a
sensation” [Gescheider et al., 1997]. In general, an organism’s sensitivity to
external stimuli varies slightly from moment to moment, but experimenters
are able to accurately estimate the absolute sensory threshold by averaging
repeated measurements of the threshold value [Gescheider et al., 1997].
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1.2.1 Perceptual decision making
The logarithmic mental line described by the Fechner-Weber law manifests
itself in a subject’s probability of response curve to different stimulus in-
tensities, which goes from 0.5 probability of detection for below threshold
stimulus values, and grows logarithmically in probability until saturating at
1 for high enough stimulus intensities. Such a quantification of choice be-
havior is called a psychometric curve, and it is generally observed to have
a sigmoidal shape. The 1940s and 50s saw the rise of the a new revolution
in behavior research led by a group of individuals that called themselves
behaviorists. Ever since, a large focus of study for behaviorists has been
describing the shape of these sigmoids to different stimuli across all sensory
modalities, as well as the effect of stimulus perturbations on the parameters
of the sigmoid. The advances in technology made possible by electricity
allowed behavior researchers to present stimuli and record data with un-
precedented accuracy. Today, modern technology allows neuroscientists to
compute a psychometric curve for neuronal responses, the neurometric curve.
A major milestone for psychophysics and the study of perceptual decisions
was accomplished by perhaps the most renown behaviorist, B.F. Skinner.
During his graduate studies, B.F. Skinner created the operant conditioning
chamber to electronically present and control stimuli such as light flashes
or speaker produced sounds. Similarly, subject responses are electronically
measured and recorded, creating an objective record of the outcome of an
experiment. This apparatus is now commonly known as the Skinner box.
Skinner published his findings in 1938, revolutionizing the study of behavior
[Skinner, 1938]. Neuroscientists and behavioral economists today continue
to make great use of the Skinner box in order to obtain the precise timing of
electronically measured choices. A Skinner box with two response levers or
buttons has been a favorite tool to measure and describe human and animal
psychophysical responses. The simple experimental design makes it possible
to link choice behavior, for example reaction time distributions and psycho-
metric curves, to formal mathematical models of the underlying cognitive
operation required to complete the task.
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1.3 Models of decision making
1.3.1 Cognitive models of choice behavior
The data generated during a standard two choice task allows researchers
to create descriptive models of the decision making process. These models
can express the computation supporting the decision in terms of stimulus
signal and noise at the level of the sensory organs and neural decision cen-
ters. The drift diffusion model (DDM) is perhaps the most common of such
theoretical approaches to the problem of deciding among two choices based
on uncertain evidence [Ratcliff, 1978, Ratcliff, 1985, Ratcliff, 2002]. One of
the remarkable feats of a standard drift diffusion model is its ability to
make predictions about the psychometric curve of a subject by using only
the reaction time data to fit the model and vice-versa [Ratcliff, 2002]. Drift
diffusion is a name applied to a family of models that describes the delib-
eration in choice behavior as a “Drunken” random walk taken by a particle
to one of two choice boundaries. The mean direction of the particle is a
parameter that depends on the strength of the stimulus, and random per-
turbations to the mean walk are caused by a parameter(s) that captures
noise in the sensory observations, noise in the processing of these obser-
vations at the decision centers in the brain, or both. The drift diffusion
family of models has been found to find equivalent solutions to the sequen-
tial probability ratio test [Wald and Wolfowitz, 1948], which aims to provide
sequential hypothesis testing [Stone, 1960, Ratcliff et al., 2016]. While the
technique was developed for engineering and manufacturing applications,
this method has been applied to describe the stopping criterion for human
decision processes as early as 1960 [Stone, 1960]. The recent availability
of cheap and fast computers to fit the model parameters has popularized
the use of drift diffusion models in the field of decision making to for ex-
ample, characterize stopping criterion (e.g. reaction time and accuracy)
[Ratcliff, 1985]. The drift diffusion model has also been used to explain
valued based choices [Milosavljevic et al., 2010], and other neural processes
such as memory [Ratcliff, 1978]. A recent study modeling normative solu-
tions to the standard 2AFC decision task found that the optimal trade-off
between certainty against the cost of time computed using the partially
observable Markov decision process framework is equivalent to drift diffu-
sion with time collapsing bounds [Drugowitsch et al., 2012]. That study ex-
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tended the classic SPRT result to cases where the reliability of the evidence
(what we call ’difficulty’) is unknown to the agent [Drugowitsch et al., 2012].
1.3.2 Evidence of computational models in the brain
The big unanswered question until the beginning of this century was whether
and how the components of behavior captured by the drift diffusion frame-
work are reflected in the firing rates of neurons in the brain. In order to
experimentally address this question, it became necessary to record neural
activity while an animal performed a decision task. A pioneer study managed
to obtain single cell recordings from the lateral intraparietal cortex of behav-
ing rhesus monkeys. It was found that choice movements were only initiated
if neural activity reached a certain threshold, and that stochastic variability
in the rate at which neuronal activity grew to that threshold resulted in the
distribution of behavioral reaction times [Hanes and Schall, 1996]. Shadlen
and colleagues (e.g. [Gold and Shadlen, 2001, Mazurek et al., 2003]) have
made significant efforts to advance both experimental and theoretical re-
search regarding evidence accumulation processes in the brain. Recent work
by Carlos Brody’s group has also observed evidence accumulation recording
from neurons in posterior parietal cortex and FOF from rats performing a
perceptual decision-making task [Hanks et al., 2015]. Although these find-
ings are consistent with models of evidence accumulation, there are com-
peting views, for example, one which argues that the increasing firing rates
observed in the monkey and rat brains reflect an urgency signal rather than
evidence accumulation [Cisek et al., 2009].
1.3.3 Embodied models of decision making
The models described above can be considered “cognitive” models since they
are only concerned with the final outcome of the task, assuming that the
execution of a response movement is handled by downstream motor cen-
ters that are independent from and do not affect the computations at the
decision centers. While such models manage to capture the psychometric
curve and response time distributions of human and animal subjects, the as-
sumption of independence between the decision and motor centers is made
out the necessity to simplify the computational problem rather than a belief
that this is how biological organisms arrive at naturalistic choices. More
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complex computations, for example a distributed representation of choices
that takes into consideration biological constraints, such as biomechanical
costs for moving, have been proposed [Thura et al., 2012]. Recent studies
that model embodied decisions modify the drift diffusion framework to allow
for processing of the stimulus in parallel with action initiation and execu-
tion, with the basic premise that these processes can bias the decision of
the animal in ways that optimise the ecological choices in naturalistic en-
vironments [Resulaj et al., 2009, Martinez-Hernandez et al., 2015]. Relative
to the purely cognitive models, the embodied models models can result in
faster actions when the task at hand is easy, and action corrections when
the task is hard [Resulaj et al., 2009, Martinez-Hernandez et al., 2015].
1.4 Online readouts of behavior
As a subject makes a choice, we hypothesized that her online behavior dur-
ing the deliberation period might reveal hints of the process happening in
her decision centers. If a random walk to one of two choices is indeed hap-
pening in the subject’s brain, can it be observed directly from behavior
while it is happening? We found the traditional binary choice task with its
single button press response too constraining to allow the study of situa-
tions in which online behavior could couple with the mental computations
leading to a choice. We were inspired by previous studies replacing but-
ton presses with reach trajectories to one of two targets, for example using
a computer mouse [Spivey et al., 2005] or a haptic joystick like controller
[Resulaj et al., 2009]. These studies observed hesitant trajectories when the
choice was difficult, the first study in the form of down the middle trajec-
tories [Spivey et al., 2005], and the second observed occasional changes of
mind [Resulaj et al., 2009], which the authors could predict using a two-
stage drift diffusion model. However, these studies did not link the moment
to moment accumulation process to online movements that could reflect se-
quences of sub-decisions. We hypothesised that either the simple nature
of the stimulus [Spivey et al., 2005] or the extinction of stimulus presenta-
tion time during the movement period [Resulaj et al., 2009], prevented these
studies from further linking the online evolution of the mental process to on-
line movements. A subsequent study managed to link the mental evidence
accumulation to a sub-threshold motor signal prior to the start of choice
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movements [Selen et al., 2012]. Our initial objective was to link the process
of evidence accumulation to online movements, somehow. After successfully
designing an experiment that allowed us to observe movement during the
deliberation period, understanding and modeling the conditions that allow
such coupling of mental and motor processes to occur became the second
objective of this thesis.
1.5 Normative models of decision making
With our online readouts of behavior, we managed to collect data of sub-
jects showing movements during the decision period, and furthermore could
show that these movements were predictive of the fluctuations in time of
the random stimulus. We knew that the movements reflected a form of hes-
itation or lack of commitment to either choice, since they appeared mostly
during hard trials. The uncommitted or hesitant “down the middle” aspect
of our trajectories had previously been reported by [Dale et al., 2007], and
corrective movements correlated to fluctuations in the stimulus were previ-
ously shown by [Resulaj et al., 2009]. However, the ability to measure the
continuous modulation of sequences of behavioral output tuned to a stim-
ulus during a binary choice discrimination constituted a novel approach to
the laboratory study of the decision making problem. We next looked for a
theory that could explain this phenomenology. The insights from the accu-
mulation of evidence to a bound models were not directly applicable to our
data, since those tasks typically ended when the initial choice was made.
The changes of mind extension to the drift diffusion framework also did not
seem to provide a sufficient framework for our data, which sometimes con-
tained what appeared to be multiple changes of mind. We finally turned to
reinforcement learning (RL) to study normative solutions to our evidence
accumulation task. We started from a recently published theoretical frame-
work that uses insights from the SPRT and reinforcement learning (RL)
to find optimal solutions to the binary discrimination accumulation task,
given a temporal constraint [Moreno-Bote, 2010, Drugowitsch et al., 2011,
Drugowitsch et al., 2012]. We generalized this framework to include the spa-
tial navigation component in our task by including a spatial constraint, a
cost for moving towards the targets in a discrete grid world. Through our
simulations, we came to understand the set of circumstances required to elicit
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hesitant choice behavior (as well as fully committed behavior). By assuming
parameters regarding the signal-to-noise in the perception of the stimulus,
as well as parameters regarding the agent’s urgency to act, and the amount
of motor effort involved in her actions, our model’s choice trajectories cap-
ture the main phenomenology that we observed in our psychophysical work.
Namely, that difficult stimuli cause subjects and agents to make correcting
movements, resulting in longer choice trajectories. In the RL agent, this
occurs because when uncertainty is high, the agent finds intermediate posi-
tions more valuable, as extreme positions make it difficult to correct initial
wrong choices. Only longer oscillations in the stimulus cause beliefs extreme
enough to act upon. This results in a loose tracking of the stimulus by the
agent.
1.6 Commitment
The agent moves when her believes about the stimulus cross belief thresh-
olds. If the agent still has enough time to reach either target, changes of
mind occur any time the opposite threshold is crossed. We call this a soft
decision bound since the actions are reversible. However, when the agent is
closer to a target, it will take her longer to travel back to the other target
should she change her mind. This constraint together with the time pres-
sure eventually causes the decision bounds to be final or irreversible, as no
other action than approaching the closest target is estimated to ever have
higher value at any future time. Thus, the agent must commit to her current
choice. We call this a hard or irreversible decision bound. Our framework
shows that positive feedback naturally arises when temporally-extended de-
cisions are made by embodied agents, and that this form of “commitment”
is likely to generally contribute to the categorical nature of decision-making
in naturalistic scenarios facing organisms with temporal and spatial costs.
1.7 Aim of the thesis
Our goals were to design a decision making task that allowed subjects to
move during the deliberation of a binary choice in order to observe or infer
an online decision variable directly from behavior. However, we needed to
be careful not to depart too much from the classical binary choice configura-
On Hesitation and Commitment 10
1 Introduction: Decision making in the brain of embodied agents
tion, which has the strength that it constrains behavior so that meaningful
statistics can be computed from the generated data. This of course proved
to be more difficult than we anticipated, but resulted in the collection of
novel data, the hesitant decision trajectories, for which providing an expla-
nation became at least as daunting of a task. The explicit questions that
are investigated in this thesis are the following:
• How can the evidence accumulation process be studied from the online
behavior of human subjects?
• Are online choice trajectories measured during the performance of a
binary choice task reflective of the evidence accumulation process?
• Why do subjects display complex decision trajectories when the stim-
ulus is hard?
• What are the circumstances for which complex decision trajectories
arise?
Chapter 2 explains the design and construction of Experiment 1, a novel
psychophysical task that allowed us to capture movements during the execu-
tion of the task. The second half of the chapter is concerned with Experiment
2, which had the aim of creating experimental conditions that allowed us to
observe more complex trajectories per experimental session. The modifica-
tions implemented in Experiment 2 mark the start of our quest to understand
why the complex trajectories arise to begin with. The chapter includes a
deeper analysis of our online measures of behavior.
Chapter 3 is concerned with optimal decision making models that can
solve a simplified version of our task. This work helped us understand the
circumstances for which complex decision trajectories arise, and allowed us
to construct a psychophysical task that provides better control the spatial
constraints and time urgency with respect to Experiment 1 and 2.
Chapter 4 describes Experiment 3, a psychophysical task with simpler
controls than our previous experiments, and more explicit feedback regard-
ing rewards for correct answers against a penalty for time passing. Precise
inter-press intervals across difficulties for all 4 tested subjects suggest sub-
jects are performing the same task, and despite this stereotyped mode of
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pressing, a distinction between confident vs hesitant decision trajectories in
response to the stimulus can be appreciated.
Chapter 5 summarizes and discusses all the above results, and in par-
ticular the implications of our findings for binary choices vs more complex
designs in Perceptual DM, the interaction between action and belief dur-
ing sequential sampling problems, cost of action in (perceptual) DM and
“geometric” costs, and the nature of commitment.
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Chapter 2
Online measures of behavior
during a decision making task
HIGHLIGHTS
• In this chapter we describe a novel psychophysics task in
order to measure behavior during the deliberation period of
a binary choice task.
• Hesitant trajectories can be observed in a small fraction of
the trials in Experiment 1. On average the length of the
trajectories increases with increasing stimulus difficulty.
• In order to capture more hesitant trajectories per session,
Experiment 2 imposes a time limit to initiate movements
from the start of the stimulus.
• In Experiment 2, trajectory length increases significantly
with increasing stimulus difficulty for all subjects. No con-
sistent difference can be seen for correct vs. incorrect trials
across subjects.
• It is possible to reconstruct the noisy stimulus from linear
combinations of eye and hand trajectories. This shows that
the online trajectories hold information about temporal fea-
tures of the stimulus.
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2.1 Abstract
The behavioral evidence typically used to infer the mechanisms underlying
decision making processes consist of reaction time (RT) and choice, which
reflect only the final output of the decision, and is therefore only indirectly
informative on the decision process itself. In order to gain more direct access
to the decision process from behavior, we set-up an auditory two-alternative
forced choice task (2AFC) perceptual decision-making task with two online
behavioral read-outs: motor output and pupil size. Changes in pupil size
have been associated with altered vigilance [Rajkowski et al., 1994]. For ex-
ample in one study using chair-restrained, unanesthetized cynomolgus mon-
keys, pupil dilation was correlated to locus coeruleus neuronal activity, which
was higher during behavioral agitation than during goal-directed task behav-
ior [Rajkowski et al., 1994]. In addition to these changes in tonic activity,
LC neurons were also phasically responsive to certain sensory stimuli. It
may be more correct to think about pupil measures as physiology rather
than behavior. In the task, human subjects have to decide whether the
overall lateralization of a time-varying white-noise stimulus is left or right.
Lateralization is controlled using the interaural level difference (ILD) of the
stimulus, delivered through headphones. The instantaneous ILD is chosen
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with a given probability every 25 ms from a set of ILD values, and the overall
difficulty is controlled by rigidly moving this probability function. Subjects
report their choices by moving a joystick-controlled dot in a computer screen
to either of two lateral locations and are free to move the joystick throughout
the stimulus presentation. Pupil size is monitored through the experiment.
Stable psychometric functions confirm that the subjects can reliably perform
this task. A small fraction of subject responses (15 %) elicited during the
presentation of difficult stimuli are not direct to either target, but rather
wiggling between the two targets down the middle. We think subjects’ hes-
itation in the deliberation period is coupled to the stimulus, and therefore
to the underlying decision making process, but more data was needed for
meaningful analysis. In a second experiment we managed to increase the
number of hesitant trajectories displayed by subjects by introducing time
pressure on movement onset. Analysis of these trajectories allowed us to
establish a correlation between online behavior and the stochastic stimulus.
2.2 Introduction
The study of human and animal choice behavior has traditionally been re-
stricted to laboratory preparations such as the two-alternative forced choice
task (2AFC). In a typical 2AFC task, two stimuli are presented successively
or side-by-side, and subjects are asked to choose and report one of the two
options contingent on their percept of some stimulus feature (e.g. presence,
amount, identity), or simply based on their preference for one option, by
pressing one of two levers. The two options can be presented simultaneously
or in two sequential intervals. The studies on perceptual reports of a stimulus
feature belong to the subfield of perceptual decision making, while choices
of preference fall under the umbrella of value-based decision making. While
we focus on the perceptual decision making literature, significant cross-talk
between the subfields means that the state-of-the art techniques are not
exclusive to either field. The 2AFC task is said to be unbiased by subjec-
tive internal criteria unrelated to the task at hand [Pelli and Farell, 1996].
However, the study of choice in maximally reduced laboratory settings has
also precluded these studies from learning about the decision process while
the decision is ongoing. For example, Spivey and colleagues showed com-
pelling evidence for continuous uptake of sensory input and dynamic compe-
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tition between simultaneously active representations in the performance of
a spoken-language task by recording the streaming x, y coordinates of con-
tinuous goal-directed hand movement [Spivey et al., 2005]. In that speech
recognition study, two pictures appeared on the top left and top right of a
computer screen, and subjects were required to make a reach movement from
to bottom of the screen towards the correct picture, via computer mouse,
according to the word spoken over headphones. Spivey observed that the
movement trajectories revealed whether the two choices are phonetic com-
petitors or not, for example candy vs candle compete, and candy vs horse
do not compete. We wanted to conduct psychophysical experiments in this
fashion, but using perceptual stimuli such as the noisy stimulus utilized by
Shadlen and colleagues in [Selen et al., 2012]. We favored such a stimulus be-
cause we though that observing changes in behavior as a function of changes
in the stimulus parameters would allow us to understand something about
the cognitive process in between. Shadlen and colleagues were able to model
and predict the changes of mind by extending their bounded accumulation of
evidence model to one with two bounds. However, in order to fit their model
to human data, the experimenters constrained the evidence accumulation to
immediately after the initiation of the reach movement. They extinguished
the stimulus as soon as subjects began their choice trajectory. However, we
are interested in monitoring behavior while the stimulus is ongoing. Unlike
[Selen et al., 2012], we conduct our study in the auditory domain given the
relative ease of producing calibrated sounds.
2.3 Methods of Experiment 1
2.3.1 Subjects
Two naive subjects learned to discriminate the stochastic sound stimulus,
and by their 3rd session produced reasonable psychometric curves. The sub-
ject performed 720 and 1080 trials across 8 and 12 sessions respectively. Two
subjects were discarded for having too extreme biases during the calibration
routine (a simpler version of this experiment with a single ILD white noise
burst per trial).
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2.3.2 Sound Stimulus
Below we describe the construction of an auditory stimuli created from se-
quences of white noise biased to the left or to the right. Our first attempt
at creating such stochastic sequences of a controlled stimulus was only used
in Experiment 1, but we do not show that data since were more successful
in capturing movement during the decision period using the second stimu-
lus. The second stimulus is also stochastically sampled from a biased ILD
distribution, but it moves slower through the subject’s sound space, this is
accomplished by constraining the maximum ILD difference from one sample
to the next using Markov Chains. We only show the analysis of Experiment
1 for the second stimulus, and this second stimulus was the only one used
in Experiment 2. In chapter 3 we replace the stimulus by much simpler
sequences of white noise, where each individual chunk of stimulus is a fully
lateralized burst with a binomial probability of being to the left or to the
right.
We induce the percept of a lateral sound by manipulating the difference in
the intensity of sound arriving at each ear, the interaural level difference
(ILD), which is a major cue assisting sound localization in mammals. We
play gaussian noise to both ears while keeping the average binaural sound
pressure level (SPL) constant, and apply some ILD to the baseline noise from
a finite set of possible ILDs every few milliseconds. By controlling the prob-
ability of drawing each ILD, we create stimuli with different levels of average
lateralization for which the subject must indicate which side was on average
“louder.” We present sounds over calibrated headphones (Sennheiser HD
280 Pro) using an internal sound card (Asus Xonar Essence ST). In order to
make our stimuli salient but comfortable to listen to during extensive test-
ing, we fixed the binaural level at 50 dB SPL. Our experience is that a 3 dB
ILD is necessary to attain 90% performance in naive subjects, and invariable
perfect performance is attained with sounds lateralized to either side by 6
dB ILD. To reduce the ambiguity of our time-varying stimulus, we decided
to use sounds lateralized by more than 4 dB to either side. Our time-varying
stimulus is constructed with the repertoire of ILDs [ -12 -8 -4 0 4 8 12 ] dB,
where negative values indicate lateralization to the left and positive values
indicate lateralization to the right. We keep the 0 dB ILD in the repertoire
as the sole noise factor. In order to avoid sound artifacts caused by changing
the sound pressure level produced by our headphones too quickly, we draw
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and apply a new ILD every 25 ms, with a 5% cosine ramp-up and a 5%
ramp-down. This results in noise segments that remain constant for 22.5
ms before smoothly changing to a new ILD, unless the new value drawn
is the same as the previous in which case the constant period is longer as
the figure of the first stimulus we used shows below. We build time-varying
stimuli with 8 second duration out of 320 such 25ms segments. Subjects
were scored and received visual and auditory feedback of correct and error
responses. For the purpose of this feedback, a stimulus was considered as
Left or Right according to the mean of the stimulus a subject experienced
until reporting her choice, at which time the stimulus was extinguished.
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Figure 2.1: We use the interaural level difference (ILD) to create sounds that give
the percept of lateralization (left or right). By changing the ILD every 25 millisec-
onds with controlled probabilities, we create sounds that change their lateralization
in time, but are overall louder to one side. The time-varying stimulus envelope is
pointwise multiplied by white noise. Top panel: 6 rows of probabilities of sampling
from the ILD repertoire determine the mean laterality of the stimulus. Bottom
panel: Sampling a sequence of ILDs for medium left difficulty in order to create
the stimulus envelope, which is convoluted with white noise in order to produce
the stimulus sound waves for each channel.
Finally, to mitigate the effects of stimulus onset and offset on the audi-
tory pathways similar to that of the unwanted auditory artifacts discussed
above, we have added 150 ms of non-time-varying cosine ramp-up and ramp-
down (see image below). This raises a concern that any auditory deficits to
either side could result in biasing the percept of the stimulus towards the
opposite side. Subjects for which the point of subjective indifference for
sounds with a static ILD is not near 0 dB may decide which side the av-
erage lateralization of the entire stimulus favors based on the ramps rather
than the time-varying stimulus we are interested in. This is the first motive
we have for conducting a pre-testing calibration on each subject to deter-
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mine their point of subjective indifference, which we then use to adjust the
ramps and stimuli to that particular subject. The improved stimulus used
in Experiment 3 (Chapter 4) neglects the need for this calibration.
Figure 2.2: Example of a 3 second sequence of white noise with time-varying sound
pressure level (one channel shown), with the ramp up and ramp down periods of
150 milliseconds calibrated to the subject’s auditory mid-line at 60 dB SPL.
Although the probabilistic changes featured in our time-varying sound
are useful for example generate the linear reconstructions of the stimulus
from online motor output, or to conduct reverse correlation analysis (not
shown), the stimulus itself sounds very synthetic. The stimulus sometimes
transition from one side of the subject’s auditory field to the other in only 2.5
ms create two difficulties: 1. Sounds in nature do not behave in this manner,
so the perception elicited by this stimulus is not at all one of something
moving across the subject’s sound space. 2. We want to test whether the
motor system will be engaged by this changing stimulus before the subject
has arrived at a decision, but the time constant for our stimulus is much
shorter (25 ms) than even the blink reflex (100 ms) [Shahani, 1970]. In
order to overcome these two problems, we developed a second sound stimulus
that preserves the probabilistic nature of the first, but abides to additional
criteria concerning the transitions that the sound can make. We employ
Markov chains to shape the random walk between ILD states as to give the
transitions 1, 2, or 3 degrees of freedom. That is, from the current ILD the
sound should only go to an adjacent ILD, to an ILD 2 or 1 step away, or to an
ILD 3, 2, or 1 step away. An illustration for transitions with 1 and 2 degrees
of freedom can be seen below. We apply the Metropolis-Hastings Chain
algorithm to our desired random walks to obtain the transition probabilities
that converge to our steady state distributions [Boyd et al., 2004]. Next, we
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show an example transition matrix and describe how to use it to construct
the random walk stimulus. We begin by choosing the overall lateralization
we want to obtain, and the degrees of freedom the transitions between ILDs
can have. We next describe the stimulus construction for the medium left
condition: We draw one sample from the corresponding distribution, in this
case π2, and the result will be the current ILD. Say the current ILD is -4,
then we would pick the 3rd row from our transition probability matrix and
sample once from this distribution. The result becomes the current ILD,
and we continue to to draw from the distribution indicated by the transition
matrix until 120 samples have been drawn (3 seconds of sound formed by
25ms segments). By chance, some of the constructed sequences will not have
converged to the steady state distribution in 120 samples. We generated
10,000 sequences to be able to pick 3 sequences per stimulus condition that
are have a maximum l1 distance of 10% with respect to their steady state
distribution and a maximum difference ±0.1 dB from the established mean
ILD for that condition.
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Figure 2.3: Top panels show the construction of sound stimuli that are generated
by sampling from a random distribution of interaural level differences biased to
negative (left) or positive (right) values. Markov chains are used to compute a
transition probability matrix that constrains the step size to jump only to neigh-
boring ILD values in order to create a more continuous stimulus that sounds like
the sound source is moving inside the subject’s head rather than jumping from side
to side. Bottom panel shows sample stimulus sequences color coded by difficulty
such that Blue denotes stimuli to the right, Red stimuli to the left, and lighter
colors denote harder stimuli.
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2.3.3 Online measures of behavior
The haptic joystick utilized in the [Selen et al., 2012] study can be used
to monitor online arm movements, but its ability to perturb arm move-
ments comes at a high monetary cost. Since we only desired to measure
behavior, we decided to build a simpler set-up such as the one utilized by
[Spivey et al., 2005], which could monitor hand trajectories at 60 Hz via
computer mouse. We settled for a pc joystick that would similarly allow
us to monitor online behavior at 60 hz and display a corresponding cursor
through the pc monitor. Eye movements were tracked at 30 fps using a
Pupil-Labs eye tracking headset and their open source software previously
described [Kassner et al., 2014]. The experiments from Chapter 4 are con-
ducted with a newer version of the tracker capable of 120 fps.
2.3.4 Syncing sounds to other sensors
Great care was taken to ensure that measurements across all the equipment
were synced to the sound streams by providing triggers via a NI-DAQ board
on the computer running the task. A second computer acquire the NI-DAQ
pulses and processed images from video cameras for tracking the arm and
the eye of the subject. Bonsai [Lopes et al., 2015] was used for syncing and
monitoring all these signals; our novel data is featured in their publication.
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Figure 2.4: Top panels shows how triggers produced via NI DAQ or through the
sound card itself can be used to provide information about the start of the sound on
the computer running the task to a separate computer for online measurements.
The middle panel shows how digital triggers can be used to inform the separate
computer about the end of a sound. Bottom panel shows a 5ms lag between the
execution of an early stop to the stimulus and the effective time that we can change
the state of the NI DAQ digital out.
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2.4 Results of Experiment 1
2.4.1 Accuracy
For mean ILD values greater than 4 dB to either side, both subjects respond
correctly with more than 90 percent accuracy, and mean ILD values greater
than 8 dB rarely elicit wrong responses. The psychometric curves confirm
that our task, similar as the typical 2-choice task, elicits subjective responses
that are more accurate as the stimulus gets easier.
Figure 2.5: Psychometric Curves for subject 1 (left) and subject 2 (right). Post
training data is shown for two subjects completing at least 5 sessions of 144 trials.
Each session lasted less than 15 minutes. Stimuli were presented in an sound
proof booth over calibrated headphones. Colored dots denote the mean proportion
of left responses for a particular mean ILD value across all sessions. Error bars
show standard deviations computed across sessions.
2.4.2 Reaction Time
Another feature typically observed in these tasks is that easier stimuli, in
addition to leading to more accurate responses, also elicit faster response
times on average. Analysis of response times in our task reveals this average
slow down of responses for harder stimuli, although a linear trend is only
significant for subject 1’s left oriented stimuli (negative ILD).
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Figure 2.6: Response Times for subject 1 (left) and subject 2 (right). ILD Con-
ditions is defined as the bin centers of the histogram of experienced ILDs with 6
equal bin sizes used to compute the psychometric curves of 2.5. The exact val-
ues of ILD conditions can vary between the subjects. Response times appear to
decrease as the ILD conditions become easier (darker colors), however, the trend
is only significant for subject 1’s left sided responses. Error bars show standard
deviations.
2.4.3 Choice Trajectory Analysis
Next, we analyze the online behavior of the subjects. Choice trajectories
for this experiment were mainly movements direct to the target of choice.
However, on a small fraction of the more difficult trials, more complex tra-
jectories going down the middle and changing direction could be observed.
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Figure 2.7: Choice trajectories for subject 1 (top) and subject 2 (bottom). Red
shifted colors indicate responses to a left biased stimulus while Blue denotes re-
sponses to a right biased stimulus, with lighter colors indicating higher difficulty.
One way to summarize this phenomenology is by the length of the choice
trajectory for each trial, defined as the cumulative sum of the displacement
across the x axis only. When we plot trajectory length as a function of the
absolute ILD (collapsing left and right trials), a significant linear decrease
of trajectory length with increasing average ILD values across the trial can
be observed.
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Figure 2.8: Choice trajectory vs stimulus strength (absolute average ILD across
the trial) for subject 1 (left) and subject 2 (right). Blue circles are data. Red line
shows linear fit with negative weights for both subjects indicating that the Trajec-
tory Length decreases with increasing mean absolute ILD (decreasing difficulty),
p<0.001.
We investigate this effect further by analyzing correct and incorrect
choice trials separately. This analysis reveals that the linear decrease in
trajectory length with decreasing trial difficulty is significant for correct tri-
als, but not for incorrect trials for both subjects.
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Figure 2.9: Choice trajectory vs stimulus strength (absolute average ILD across the
trial) for subject 1 (left) and subject 2 (right). Blue circles are data. For correct
trials (left plots), Red line shows linear fit with negative weights for both subjects
indicating that the Trajectory Length decreases with increasing mean absolute ILD
(decreasing difficulty), p<0.001. For incorrect trials (right plots), Blue line shows
linear fit with negative weights for both subjects indicating that the Trajectory
Length decreases with increasing mean absolute ILD (decreasing difficulty), Not
Significant.
2.5 Discussion of Experiment 1
This first experiment showed us that it is possible to extend the standard
two-choice task to obtain behavior during the deliberation period by incor-
porating a spatial component. Stable psychometric curves across several
sessions and the pattern of increased reaction times with increasing trial
difficulty are important, since they tell us that final choice behavior in this
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task resembles that of the standard task. This is meaningful since it en-
ables proper statistical analysis of the data, and because any insights we
draw are best interpreted in light of classical and modern psychophysics re-
search. Although previous studies had already incorporated such a spatial
component to the binary choice task [Spivey et al., 2005, Selen et al., 2012],
and stochastic time-varying stimuli [Nienborg and Cumming, 2007], to our
knowledge this is the first time that a stochastic time-varying stimulus was
presented while subject behavior was densely measured.
To the bare eye, the most salient feature of our data is perhaps the oc-
currence of hesitant choice trajectories elicited during some hard trials. This
phenomenology finds a natural summary statistic in the length of the choice
trajectory. The fact that trajectory length was only significantly correlated
to the overall mean of the stimulus for correct trials might be a hint that
our online measures of behavior hold information about the subject’s confi-
dence that they are making the right choice. Different patterns of behavior
for correct vs incorrect trials have been linked to confidence by previous
studies [Zariwala et al., 2013], but this has typically been studied from reac-
tion times, which decrease as stimulus difficulty decreases for correct trials
whereas incorrect trials have the opposite profile. However, a separate anal-
ysis of reaction times for correct vs incorrect trials did not reveal this effect
for our task (this negative result is not shown).
Although these initial results were exciting to us, we found that the
number of complex trajectories per subject were too few for more meaningful
analysis, motivating us to tweak the task such that more complex trajectories
could be observed (Figure 2.17). Our follow up experiment is detailed next.
2.6 Motivation for Experiment 2
While we managed to create a decision making task in the auditory domain
in which behavior could be tracked beyond accuracy and reaction time dur-
ing the discrimination period, the number of hesitant decision trajectories
were too few for meaningful analysis. We wanted to observe more trajec-
tories of this type, since we thought they might reflect online information
about the state of the subject’s decision. We suspected that a sense of ur-
gency to move would be needed to match a subject’s movements with the
faster time-scale of the stimulus and the subject’s moment-to-moment be-
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liefs about it. We thus decided to add the constraint that subjects should
initiate their choice trajectories within 500 milliseconds of the start of the
stimulus, else the trial was aborted. This modification resulted in a much
higher number of hesitant trajectories per session for Experiment 2 rela-
tive to Experiment 1. The new data allowed us to statistically explore the
relationship between the time varying stimulus and the online movements.
We found that linear combinations of eye and hand signals allow the recon-
struction of the temporal structure of the stimulus. Understanding how this
coupling arises required a more theoretical approach, the topic of Chapter
3, which in itself led to further change the task described in Chapter 4.
2.7 Methods of Experiment 2
2.7.1 Subjects
Subjects received 3 training sessions prior to entering the experiment. A
total of 5 naive subjects were considered for this experiment, but 1 subject
was excluded because he failed to achieve a 70 percent correct performance
by the 3rd session, all other 4 subjects went onto the experiment. All subjects
performed 1080 trials across 12 sessions (3 sessions per day with a small
break in between). Psychometric curves constructed from these 12 sessions
are shown for all subject in the results section.
2.7.2 Task
Experiment 2 had two modifications relative to Experiment 1. First, in
order to increase the dynamic range or the arena, subjects now had to move
their arm forward (y-direction of arena). We thought requiring reach-like
movements to complete the task could lead to higher chances of engaging
the motor system during the task. Second, in order to impose a sense of
urgency, subjects were instructed to begin moving within 500 milliseconds
of the start of the sound. Failure to move within 500 milliseconds resulted
in an annoying buzzing sound and the screen markers flashing red. Subjects
were free to take as long as 8 seconds (the maximum stimulus duration) to
report their final choice.
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Subject initiates trial 
with button press
Subject centers the 
pointer
Sound starts after 
random delay




Figure 2.10: Schematic of temporal sequence of events in the task.
2.7.3 Stimulus
The stimulus is as the colored stimulus described in Experiment 1 2.3, but
with one small change. The steady-state distribution from which sounds
were sampled was changed to a uniform distribution of ILDs from -6dB to
+6dB, which was shifted by 0.5, 2, or 4 dB to negative values to induce a left
bias and to positive values to induce right bias. This modification resulted
in qualitatively similar sounds as before, but the sampled ILD distribution
converges to the theoretical mean of the stimulus slightly faster. Subjects
were scored and received feedback according to the mean of the stimulus
they experienced until reporting their choice, at which time the stimulus was
extinguished. An example of an easy left trial with this slightly modified
stimulus is shown. The figure shows a distribution shifted by -3 dB, however
in the experiment the distribution was shifted by -4dB to make the stimulus
even easier.
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Figure 2.11: Top left: Sample easy left stimulus. Bottom Left: Uniform steady
state distribution the stimulus is sampled from. Top right: Left channel white
noise stimulus. Bottom right: Right channel white noise stimulus.
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2.8 Results of Experiment 2
2.8.1 Accuracy




































































Figure 2.12: Psychometric curve for all subjects computed from 1080 trials post-
training. Colored dots denote the mean proportion of left responses for a particular
mean ILD value across all sessions. Error bars show standard deviations computed
across 12 sessions.
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Figure 2.13: Four panels with 3 rows each show the performance of each subject
across sessions. Psychometric curve bias (top), d’ (middle) and accuracy (bottom)
shows performance remained relatively stable across sessions and days. For the d’
plots, the horizontal line marks d’=1. For the Percent Correct plots, the horizontal
line marks 70 percent accuracy. Note that subjects 1 and 2 never fall below these
performance thresholds, while subjects 3 and 4 were below only 2 and 1 sessions
respectively.
2.8.2 Reaction Time
Forcing subjects to start moving within the first half second caused subjects
to have a sense of urgency that was not present in the first experiment, re-
flected in longer Reaction Times (RT), the time when the trajectory ends.
When we analyze RT as a function of the actual experienced stimulus, a sig-
nificant decrease in RT with increasing bias of the stimulus can be observed
for all subjects. Red (blue) traces show leftward (rightward) stimuli, with
lighter colors showing easier trials.
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Figure 2.14: Reaction time as a function of the long-term mean of the stimulus
(left) and the experienced mean of the stimulus (right) for each subject per row.
Blue circles show data, red lines linear fits with significant absolute mean ILD
coefficient, and blue lines linear fits that don’t have a significant absolute mean
ILD coefficient. The plots on the right column show a significant linear decrease
in reaction time with increasing absolute experienced mean trial ILD (decreasing
difficulty) for all subjects. The decrease in reaction time with decreasing absolute
long-term mean of the stimulus is also significant for 3 of the 4 subjects.
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2.8.3 Trajectory Analysis
























































































































Figure 2.15: Experiment 2 trajectories from each subject’s last 150 trials. Each
row is one subject. Left 2 columns show the x-axis in time. Right 2 columns show
the trajectories in xy.
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In order to compare the number of hesitant trajectories between the ex-
periments, it was necessary to split the hesitant trajectories from the more
ballistic or direct to target trajectories for each subject. For experiment
1 this was easily accomplished by setting a threshold on trajectory length.
However, the extension of the task to xy coordinates and the 500 millisecond
limit to begin a trajectory resulted in subjects developing unique strategies
that make it hard to classify stereotyped vs. non-stereotyped behavior. For
this reason, we used k-means clustering to divide trajectories into 2 cate-
gories on the basis of kinematic parameters of the each trajectory. Then the
cluster with lower (higher) standard deviation in trial trajectory position is
labeled as the stereotyped (hesitant) trial type.






































































Figure 2.16: Clustering of experiment 2 subject 4 data into stereotyped vs hesitant
trajectories using k-means with 2 clusters on the trajectory parameters (movement
start time, trajectory length, trajectory speed, and acceleration). Note all left
ending trajectories were flipped to end on the right prior to clustering for ease of
visualization. Left panel shows the trajectories in time, center panel shows them
in the xy coordinates of the arena, and the right panel shows the resulting clusters
in Length (top) and Speed (bottom) vs Movement Time
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Figure 2.17: We observed more hesitant trajectories for experiment 2 (right panel)
than for experiment 1 (left panel). Color code of legend identifies each subject.
As before, we plot the trajectory length as a function of the absolute
mean ILD value for each trial. A significant increase in trajectory length with
decreasing absolute mean ILD values (increasing difficulty) can be observed
for all subjects.
Figure 2.18: For all subjects we observed a significant increase in trial trajec-
tory length with decreasing absolute mean ILD values (increasing difficulty). Blue
circles show data, red lines show linear fits with significant coefficient for the in-
dependent variable.
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We once again conduct the same analysis separately for correct and in-
correct trials, but we do not observe any consistent difference in trajectory
length between correct and incorrect trials across subjects. While in ex-
periment 1 the increase in trajectory length with increasing difficulty was
significant only for the correct trials, results for experiment 2 are inconclu-
sive as only subject 2 shows the same pattern, subject 4 has a significant
effect only for incorrect trials, and subject 1 and 3 show a significant effect
for both correct and incorrect trials.
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Figure 2.19: Trajectory length analysis for correct and incorrect trials separately.
The increase in trajectory length with increasing trial difficulty is significant for
subject 1 and subject 3 for both correct and incorrect trials, while subject 2 shows it
only for correct trials and subject 4 has a significant effect only for incorrect trials.
The results of this analysis are inconclusive regarding confidence effects. Blue
circles show data, red (blue) lines show linear fits with significant (not significant)
coefficient for the independent variable.
2.8.4 Stimulus Reconstructions
The goal of the following analysis is to evaluate whether information about
the stimulus is present in the online eye and hand trajectories, by recon-
structing the stimulus from linear combinations of these online readouts of
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behavior. Regularized (ridge) linear regression of the moment-to-moment
stimulus onto the eye and hand data was performed, using for each stimulus
segment to be predicted a window of 500 milliseconds of eye and hand data,
which moves forward with the evolving stimulus. Ridge regularization was
applied due to the co-linearity problem arising from correlations in the eye
and hand data. Ridge regression minimizes squared error while regularizing
the norm of the weights by parameter λ:




(βTxi − yi)2 + λβ2. (2.1)
Training and testing was performed using the ’hold-out’ method, using
60 percent of the clean data to train the model and obtain a prediction
coefficient kernel for each subject. The linear kernels were then used to
reconstruct the stimulus from the remaining 40 percent of eye and hand data
never seen by the model, and the correlation between the resulting test set
reconstructions and the actual stimuli was computed. The regularization
coefficient was visually chosen to maximize the mean correlation between
reconstructed and actual stimuli for each subject’s test set. This method
only produced reasonable kernels and predictions restricting it to the difficult
trials (experienced trial mean ILD < 0.1 dB).
A schematic of how each linear decoder (one per time-step) is trained
with a window of eye and hand data is shown below.
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Figure 2.20: Schematic of training a decoder to predict the moment-to-moment
stimulus from a window of eye and hand data. For each stimulus segment to be
predicted a window of 500 milliseconds of eye and hand data, which moves forward
with the evolving stimulus. Top panel shows the target variable (stimulus), and the
corresponding predictor windows (Hand and Eye) for time-step 1. Bottom panel
shows the same variables for time-step 2.
The resulting kernels for all subjects are show in (Figure 2.21). In each
panel the top half of the plot, each slice of time shows the linear weight
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of each point in a window of the next 500 milliseconds of hand data - at
the bottom half the corresponding linear weight of windows of eye data -
for predicting the instantaneous ILD value at each time following the onset
of each stimulus sample. In subjects 1, 3, and 4, prior to the 700 ms time
following stimulus onset, patches of negative (blue) can be observed below
patches of positive (red) weights can be seen, especially in the hand ker-
nels (top). This means that hand movements are not equally informative
about the stimulus ILD at different times, and is evidence that subjects are
not integrating information equally across time in order to guide their hand
movements. Furthermore, the temporal resolution of the stimulus allows
us to see that for the hard trials considered in the analysis, hand position
is on average negatively correlated with ILD value for 100-300 milliseconds
and then correlates positively for the next 100-300 ms. This suggests that
subjects are listening for sweeps in the stimulus from one side to the other
prior to moving their hand in the direction of the sweep. Alternatively, this
pattern might be a result of the changes of direction, presumably following
sequences of changes of mind we observe in the response trajectories. In
either case, this is empirical evidence that subjects are tracking the stimulus
with their hands and eyes. The coefficients for eye data tend to be weaker,
and are more difficult to interpret, but similar but smaller patches as we
observed for the hand kernels appear to be present in the eye kernels too. In
(Figure 2.22) we show a few samples of the reconstructed stimuli, including
both good and poor reconstructions. We then show histograms of the corre-
lation between the actual stimuli and the linear reconstructions in hold-out
test data (Figure 2.23). We think the fact that the mean correlation of
these reconstructions to the true stimulus is greater than zero (p<0.001) is
meaningful, because it shows that even this very limited model can, to some
degree, accurately encode and decode the stimulus. The only subject for
which the analysis is not significant is subject 2, which is also the subject
for which the stimulus kernel becomes uninformative earliest (by 500 ms vs
700 ms for the other subjects). Qualitatively, subject 2 appears to have the
most direct to target trajectories and rarely shows more than one change
of mind (Figure 2.15). This qualitative observation is consistent with the
conclusions we reached that this subject is not tracking the stimulus, per
the more quantitative kernel and reconstruction analysis.
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Figure 2.21: Regularized (ridge) linear regression of the moment-to-moment stim-
ulus onto the eye and hand data for all subjects. Regularized (ridge) linear regres-
sion of the moment-to-moment stimulus onto the eye and hand data was per-
formed, using for each stimulus segment to be predicted a window of 500 mil-
liseconds of eye and hand data, which moves forward with the evolving stimulus.
Post-stimulus kernel refers to the prediction coefficient (β) of each sample in each
window of hand and eye data. For each plot, the top panel shows the prediction
coefficients kernel fit on 60 percent of the data (training set) for the hand data and
the bottom panel eye data. The hand and eye data were z-scored prior to fitting
the model.
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Figure 2.22: Reconstructed stimuli vs. actual stimuli sampled from the test set, not
used during training. The title for each plot shows the correlation between the two
time-series. Legend: Blue line shows the stimulus, and red line the reconstruction
from arm and eye data.
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Figure 2.23: Histograms of the correlation between actual and reconstructed stim-
uli for all subjects for the test-set. A p-value was calculated for each mean cor-
relation coefficient by shuffling the varying part of the actual stimuli in order to
create a distribution of surrogate mean correlations to the reconstructions. Mean
correlation for all subjects, except subject 2, was greater than zero and significant.
Subject 2 (top right) has the lowest mean correlation, which is also not significant.
This is to be expected from her rather ballistic trajectories, faster reaction times,
and prediction coefficients kernel which cuts off after 400 milliseconds into the
stimulus.
2.9 Discussion
Previous studies managed to obtain online readouts of behavior during the
execution of a 2AFC task, for example using a computer mouse [Spivey et al., 2005]
or a haptic joystick like controller [Resulaj et al., 2009]. In both of these
studies, hard trials elicited complex decision trajectories. One study de-
scribed these complex decision trajectories as ’in-between’ [Spivey et al., 2005],
and the other as changes of mind [Resulaj et al., 2009]. The authors of
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changes of mind in decision making could be predicted using the bounded
accumulation of evidence diffusion model. We were inspired by these stud-
ies, and wanted to extend the methodology to investigate further the rela-
tionship of online movements during the task and the stimulus. The hard
stimuli used for the discrimination task in [Spivey et al., 2005] were phono-
logical competitors such as ’candle’ and ’candy’ (vs ’dolphin’ for an easier
discrimination), which are not suitable for studying the evolution in time of
the mental processes we are interested in. Statistically constructed stimuli
such as the one used in [Nienborg and Cumming, 2007, Resulaj et al., 2009]
is more suitable for our purposes, but in those studies they extinguish the
stimulus at movement initiation. Later work by Shadlen’s group established
a correlation between the online stimulus and motor signals recorded prior to
the movement initiation [Selen et al., 2012]. We managed to obtain online
motor responses during the accumulation period in our first experiment, but
this behavior was only observed in a fraction of the more difficult trials. Our
second experiment had the explicit goal of increasing the number of hesitant
trajectories performed by the subjects in our novel binary choice task. In ex-
periment 1, we thought that subjects were waiting too long to begin moving,
allowing for their decision to evolve to a fully committed choice by the time
most actions were initiated. In experiment 2, imposing a cut-off time of 500
milliseconds to begin movements was enough to double the number of hesi-
tant trajectories observed per session. However, this constrain also resulted
in shorter reaction times and thus less time for the subjects to experience
and report on the stimulus. Our novel task allowed us to quantitatively
assess the degree to which online behavior encodes information about an
ongoing binary discrimination. Like Spivey [Spivey et al., 2005], we believe
our online readouts to be empirical evidence for continuous uptake of sensory
input and dynamic competition between simultaneously active representa-
tions (of speech lexicons in their study, of left and right ILDs or responses in
our case). However, the controlled time-varying nature of our stimulus al-
lowed us go one step further in our analysis and quantitatively estimate the
amount of information about the stimulus that is encoded in the online be-
havioral readouts. We found that linear combinations of eye and hand data
can be used to reconstruct the online stimulus. The predictive power of
our model, demonstrated through cross-validated reconstructions in (Figure
2.23), serves as validation while its simplicity facilitates the interpretation of
precise stimulus driven events that can be seen in the kernels. For example,
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we interpret the sharp drop in the prediction coefficient kernels around 700
ms for subjects 1, 3, and 4 (Figure 2.21) as a switch in subject behavior from
seemingly tracking the stimulus to ignoring it as they commit to a choice.
The patches of negative (blue) transitioning sharply to positive (red) pre-
diction weights in the hand kernels show that subjects are utilizing stimulus
information to guide their hand movements differently across time, however,
it is hard to distinguish whether these patterns are due to some heuristic
being applied by subject to process the stimulus, such as detection of sweeps
from one side to the other, or are instead due to changes of mind. We initially
thought that the transition from seemingly tracking the stimulus to ignoring
it (Figure 2.21) was a result of a non-linearity in the processing of the stim-
ulus, reflecting the categorical nature of committing to a choice. However,
the data did not allow us to exclude the hypothesis that the non-linearity
could arise from the motor component to the task (e.g. the need to control
an arm). As we tried to formalize our description of subject behavior in this
task, the question ’Why are subjects behaving in this manner in our task’
turned into ’How should subjects behave in this task?’ In order to answer
this question, we built normative models for our task by expanding upon a
normative model of the standard two choice task [Drugowitsch et al., 2012].
The original framework models an optimal agent’s urgency to act by sub-
tracting a cost for time passing from the agent’s notion of long-term rewards
in the task. Our framework generalizes the model to embodied settings re-
quiring an agent to move an arm or navigate an environment, and is the
subject of the next chapter. Ultimately, we learned that time urgency was a
necessary component in order to observe the uncommitted behavior we were
interested in studying, and it became clear that we needed to be able to con-
trol the subjects’ urgency in the task. This led to the implementation of a
point system for the task of Chapter 4 that tries to link the explicit rewards
and cost for time passing of the models of chapter 3 to monetary compen-
sation for the subjects of the experiments of Chapter 4. In experiment 3,
the subjects receive visual feedback regarding expected rewards and points
lost due to the passage of time during the execution of the task, and sum-
mary of the accumulated totals between trials. The difficulty of analyzing
subject behavior in terms of the experienced stimulus (Figure 2.21) forced
us to rethink the stimulus as well. The fast features of the stimulus are not
clearly translating to behavior, with longer sequences of stimuli (patches of
blue or red) to one single side appear to be what guides subject behavior.
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The regions of positive and negative weighs patterned after each other might
suggest that subjects are also tuning to sweeps from one side to the other
in the stimulus. We wanted to have a simpler time-varying stimulus for the
next round of experiments. We were inspired by an auditory task that used
sequences of binary (left or right) clicks in order to study decision making in
rats and humans [Brunton et al., 2013]. In the [Brunton et al., 2013] study,
auditory clicks are generated from independent Poisson processes, and the
Poisson click rates are constant for the duration of each trial. The difference
in click rates sets task difficulty. We instead use a constant click-rate (4
Hz) and modulate a single probability of a click occurring on the left or the
right, and that sing probability controls task difficulty.
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Chapter 3




• In this chapter we describe a normative reinforcement learn-
ing agent that shows hesitant decision trajectories for dif-
ficult stimuli for a range of costs for time passing and for
moving.
• The model’s average trajectory length increases significantly
with increasing stimulus difficulty (decreasing mean ILD).
• Increasing the cost of time (decreasing time limit) causes
the agent’s (soft) action bounds to narrow, such that less
extreme beliefs are required for the agent to move rather
than wait.
• Increasing the width of the arena shifts the agent’s (hard)
decision bounds to earlier times, thus committing the agent
to a choice earlier.
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3.1 Abstract
In order to understand what expected normative behavior should be in
our task we modeled reinforcement learning agents based on a recently
published theoretical framework [Drugowitsch et al., 2012]. The authors of
[Drugowitsch et al., 2012] used the partially observable Markov decision pro-
cess framework to study optimal decisions for the standard 2AFC task. We
generalized the framework to the embodied task by subtracting from the
expected rewards for correct completion of the task at different times, a
cost for moving towards the targets in a discrete grid world. Our RL agent
approaches the target she believes to be correct, and can make correcting
movements depending on the width of the arena and the urgency and move-
ment costs, capturing the phenomenology of longer choice trajectories for
more difficult trials. For a fixed movement cost, it is possible to see that
time costs and arena widths have differential effects on the behavior of the
agent. The time cost determines the magnitude of the beliefs on the stimu-
lus required for the agent to move rather than wait by setting the height of
her soft or reversible decision bounds, whereas the width of the arena can
commit the agent to earlier choices by shifting the agent’s hard irreversible
decision bounds to earlier times.
3.2 Introduction
Reinforcement Learning (RL) can provide optimal solutions to hard prob-
lems, so long as the goal of the problem and all the rules of the game can
be defined [Sutton and Barto, 2018]. In the past decade there has been an
increased interest in the field as deep RL agents managed to beat expert
humans in strategy games with millions of possible sequences of moves like
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chess [Silver et al., 2018] and Go [Google, 2015, Silver et al., 2017], and even
more complex real-time multi-player strategy video games such as StarCraft
II [DeepMind, 2019]. Until recently in the field of decision making the most
popular framework to model choices was still the classic sequential proba-
bility ratio test (SPRT) [Wald and Wolfowitz, 1948], typically in the form
of the mathematically equivalent drift diffusion framework [Stone, 1960,
Ratcliff et al., 2016]. Recent publications have managed to bridge insights
from the SPRT and RL to find normative solutions to the binary discrimina-
tion accumulation task with time pressure [Rao, 2010, Moreno-Bote, 2010,
Drugowitsch et al., 2011, Drugowitsch et al., 2012, Huang and Rao, 2013] .
Drugowitsch and his colleagues extended the classic SPRT result to cases
where the reliability of the evidence is unknown to the agent. The agents
simulated in that study can find the optimal trade-off between certainty
against the cost of time through Bayesian inference and dynamic program-
ming [Drugowitsch et al., 2012]. We generalized this framework to consider
a spatial cost for movements in the arena. In the first iterations of our
model, we simplified movement costs by penalizing the velocity of changes
in position. Excitingly, our model displayed both fully committed as well
as hesitant trajectories, for a particular range of time and movement costs.
However, this model’s trajectories were series of jumps rather than smooth
curves. A more accurate representation of the arm trajectories would require
much more computational power, since all possible accelerations and jerks
to change positions would have to be simulated in addition to all possible
positions and velocities to get to them. We were not interested in under-
standing the physical cost of moving an arm, we were rather interested in
understanding the (more cognitive) geometric cost related to the time that
it takes to traverse a distance. In order to highlight this geometric aspect,
we further simplified movements in the agent at each time step to a unit
step to the left, right, or waiting. We modeled this in the agent as a con-
stant cost per unit of movement. We do not explore the parameter for the
cost of movement, but rather keep this number at some small fixed value
and explore instead the number of movements that are required to reach the
sides of the arena to report a choice. We think this is the simplest model
that complicates the SPRT framework to more naturalistic choices, such as
one requiring movement. We modified the task in order to reflect this new
situation. We replace the joystick with button presses, but do not limit the
number of presses per time step in the task. Our goal is to constraint move-
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ments such that they correspond closer to the situation we are modeling,
but in subjects more so than in the model the specific parameters of the
arena size and time pressure have to be optimized in order to observe the
hesitant state. Anecdotally, pilot experiments with very small arenas (2 or
3 required presses) did not result in hesitant trajectories whereas the model
with these arena sizes continues to produce hesitant behavior. As we ob-
served in experiment 1, in the absence of time pressure, the default behavior
of subjects is not to move until they are committed to their final choice. By
studying the model, we convinced ourselves that the same task with discrete
rather than continuous movements (i.e. button presses) would allow us to
observe the hesitant behavior, and designed that task for human subjects.
The modeling results in (Figure 3.17) were useful to understand the arena
sizes that maximize the occurrence of hesitant behavior. Chapter 3 describes
the normative model of this task with discrete movements, and Chapter 4
describes the corresponding implementation in a human psychophysics task.
3.3 Methods
3.3.1 Task
Unlike the first two experiments, in task 3 and the following model, the
subject/agent is not rewarded according to the experienced stimulus, but
according to the theoretical bias of the stimulus. This is done in order to
close the door to strategies that minimize integration (e.g. respond as soon
as possible after counting a few frames from the stimulus). Subjects and the
agent must now reach one of the two distally separated targets before the
time limit, in view of temporally discounted rewards.
3.3.2 Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes
and Bayesian Belief
We base our work on the Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes
(POMDPs) framework described in previous studies [Rao, 2010, Moreno-Bote, 2010,
Drugowitsch et al., 2012, Huang and Rao, 2013]. The POMDP framework
makes the assumption that ‘at any particular time step, the environment is in
a particular hidden state, that is not directly accessible to the animal. This
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hidden state however can be inferred by making a sequence of sensory mea-
surements’ [Huang and Rao, 2013]. The POMDP agent computes a belief,
which is a posterior probability distribution over hidden states, of the world
given observations. The agent uses Bayesian statistics to update her belief
about the hidden state after each new observation’ [Huang and Rao, 2013].
At a current belief state, an action is selected according to the learned pol-
icy, which maps belief states to actions. In the random motion task, an
agent must decide the motion direction of a noisy stimulus by computing
her belief over the unknown direction and motion strength from sequences of
noisy observations, and selecting actions based on these beliefs to maximize
the expected sum of future rewards [Huang and Rao, 2013]. At each time
step, δt, the agent can choose either Left(-) or Right(+) to instantaneously
report what she believes the average sign of the stimulus to be, or delay her
response in order to sample more sensory evidence. The agent associates a
value to each possible future state (Left, Right, Wait). This value function is
computed by subtracting from all expected future rewards at each state the
expected cost of reaching that state (the cost of acting now vs delaying the
choice). An optimal agent with belief, g, calculates future rewards by taking
the product of her Bayesian posterior beliefs, g’ = g(t+1), and the reward
size. This calculation involves an expectation with respect to future belief,
and it is therefore necessary to compute the transition probabilities over
belief states,p(g(t+1)|g(t), a), for each action. When the animal chooses to
sample, at = t, the animal’s belief distribution at the next time step, g’, is
computed by marginalizing over all possible observations [Rao, 2010]. Ac-
cording to the principle of optimality (see the Bellman equation in the next
section), by choosing locally at the next time step the option that has the
highest estimated value for all future steps, the agent maximizes her notion
of long-term value. The value function is learned recursively from the known
future rewards all the way to the initial state by back-propagation. Once
the agent knows the action that maximizes the value function at each time
step, she no longer needs the value function to act, and can enact her policy
directly from her memorized map of belief states to actions. In the typical 2
choice task, which we commonly refer to as the disembodied situation, this
policy is the decision bound. We adopt and generalize this model to include
the simplest additional naturalistic constraint we could think of, a constant
cost per unit of displacement. Our ’embodied’ POMDP agent must take
into consideration this cost, and critically, the time that it takes to traverse
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an arena. By varying the arena size and the cost of time (aching to the
arena length), we can study the behavior of an optimal agent in response to
changes in the shape of the environment. We think that this consideration of
geometric costs constitutes a contribution to the study of decision making by
showing how these models are capable of solving more naturalistic choices.
The advantage of these models are that in addition to giving a prediction
that could be used to validate against data, they also provide an explanation
for their behavior.
3.3.3 Bellman equation for embodied 2AFC task
The principle of optimality breaks down complex optimization problems into
sequences of simpler problems. This principle is abstracted by the Bellman
equation into a recursive relationship that writes the value of a state at a cer-
tain point in time in terms of the rewards making from some initial choices
and the value of the future states that result from those initial choices.
The following is a description and implementation of how to write the Bell-
man equation for a reinforcement learning (RL) agent, which discriminates
a stream of stochastic evidence, and chooses one of two spatially distinct
targets depending on the average sign of the stimulus. The agent moves in
a manner that maximizes rewards for correct answers in light of costs for
time passing and moving in the arena. Although the decision is binary and
categorical, we consider space as an additional constraint, explicitly model-
ing graded degrees of freedom as an attempt to represent an agent physi-
cally moving in an arena. In the first iterations of our model, we simplified
movement costs by penalizing the velocity of changes in position. Although
the model produced hesitant decision trajectories, the model’s trajectories
were rather blocky or squared looking rather than the smooth curved tra-
jectories observed in the subjects. Rather than complicating the model to
produce smooth trajectories, we realized that further simplifying it to con-
sider the same 3 choices at each time step, left, right, and waiting, would
highlight the geometric aspect of having to traverse some distance, rather
than the physical cost of doing it. We generalize the POMDP framework
from [Drugowitsch et al., 2012] to include a unit cost per movement, and
limit actions to one movement per time step. Choosing correctly results in
a reward, Rll, for leftward stimuli and, Rrr, for rightward stimuli. Incorrect
responses, Rlr and Rrl, are typically assigned negative values (punishment)
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or zero value (no reward). Drugowitsch and colleagues describe the value
function of an agent that trades off certainty about the stimulus for earlier
(potential) reward given that there is a cost for the passage of time in the
task. He solves the Bellman equation with this value function to estimate
the long-term estimates of reward minus cost for each possible next action.
The output of this algorithm is a look-up table of next best action (the one
with highest value) for each time and belief in the standard 2AFC task. The
outcome is an agent that trades off speed for accuracy, similar to animals
and humans performing this task. The bellman equation for the standard
2AFC task is below: With t = time, and g = belief,
V alue(t, g) = maxActions{Expected V alue(t+ δt, g, action)} =
Action Expected V alue
max{ Right , gRrr + (1− g)Rlr,
Left , (1− g)Rll + gRlr,
Wait , 〈V (t+ δt, g(t+ δt), |g, t)〉 g(t+δt)−ctδt }, (3.1)
where g(t+ δt) ∈ (0, 1), is the agent’s belief or confidence that the stim-
ulus favors the right side (g −→ 1) or the left side (g −→ 0), and ct is the cost
per unit time δt. The agent computes the expected value of each state by
summing the products of the value of rewards reachable from her current
state, and the probability of collecting those rewards from that state.
Considering only the case when wrong trials are unrewarded (Rlr = Rrl =
0), the value function becomes
V alue(t, g) = maxActions{Expected V alue(t+ δt, g, action)} =
Action Expected V alue
max{ Right , gRrr,
Left , (1− g)Rll ,
Wait , 〈V (t+ δt, g(t+ δt))|g, t)〉g(t+δt)−ctδt }.(3.2)
We generalize this equation to an embodied task where the agent must
navigate towards one of two targets on a 2D grid (XY ) in order to collect
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rewards. At each time step, the agent moves to position (x’,y’)∈ XY as
to maximize her value function, which now includes an additional cost for
moving. We originally incorporated a cost proportional to the squared mag-
nitude of the agent’s instantaneous velocity to reach position (x’, y’) in order
to model experiment 2. However, in our final task we automatically displace
the agent (or subject cursor) in the y direction at constant velocity towards
a ceiling that corresponds to the time-limit in the task, and allow the agent
to answer at any time by reaching the lateral walls of the arena. The y po-
sition when the agent reaches either side has a 1-to-1 correspondence to the
reward minus time cost for that trial. This modification was made in order
to make the cost in time more explicit, and simplify the control of the cursor,
which now consists of discrete steps to the left or to the right. Explicitly, the
goal of the task is to maximize the number of points, obtainable by reaching
the right (left) boundary for positive (negative) values of stimulus bias µ as
early as possible.
At each time-step δt, the agent chooses how many steps to move, paying
a cost cx per unit x displaced. The agent can move to the Left or Right ter-
minal states (the arena boundaries), remain at the same x position (wait),
or move to a different x position. Each move x −→ x′ occurs over time step
δt. Waiting and moving to non-terminal x positions results in the agent
experiencing one more stimulus sample, being automatically displaced by 1
unit in y, and paying the corresponding time cost ctδt. The rewritten Bell-
man equation is as follows:
With t =time , g =belief , δx = x displacement, cx = movement cost,
Cδt = time cost TR = right terminal state, and TL = left terminal state
(T = terminal),
V alue(t, g, xt, yt) = maxActions{ExpectedV alue(t+δt, g, xt, yt, xt+δt, yt+δt)} =
Action Expected V alue
max{ xt −→ xTR, gRrr − cxδx,
xt −→ xTL, (1-g)Rll − cxδx,
xt −→ xt+δt ∀ xt+δt /∈ xT , 〈V (t+ δt, g(t+ δt), xt+δt, yt+δt|g, t)〉g(t+δt)
- ctδt−cxδx }(3.3)
With
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〈V (t+ δt, g(t+ δt), xt+δt, yt+δt|g, t)〉g(t+δt) =∫
g(t+δt) p(g(t+δt|g, t))V (t+ δt, g(t+ δt), xt+δt, yt+δt)
obtained by integrating the product of the analytical solution to the be-
lief transition probability, p(g(t+ δt|g, t)), described below and
V (t+ δt, g(t+ δt), xt+δt, yt+δt) obtained by iterative back-propagation of the
value function, assumed to equal gR at the terminal state V (T, g) for a T
long enough that the agent must by then be sure of her belief on the stimulus.
3.3.4 Belief Transition Probabilities
In the Drugowitsch and colleagues framework, the stimulus is brownian
noise, meaning "it is momentarily gaussian distributed δx(t) ∼ N(µδt, δtσ2)
for a small period of time δt , with mean µδt and variance δtσ2, where
|µ| is the stimulus strength, and µ ≥ 0, µ ≤ 0 correspond to rightward
and leftward favoring stimuli respectively. This evidence corresponds to a
drift diffusion model dx/dt = µ + η(t) with drift rate µ and noise η(t) ∼
N(0, σ2) and x(t) describes the trajectory of a drifting/diffusing particle,"
[Drugowitsch et al., 2012]. In order to make sense of sensory evidence, the
disembodied agent generates a posterior belief (g) on µ given available ev-
idence δs1:t, up until time t, which is the product of her prior about the
stimulus s = N(µ, σ2) with the likelihood of experiencing a stream of ev-
idence ∏nN(δsn|µδt, δtσ2). This results in the following belief transition
probability function:
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p(g(t+ δt)|g(t), t) = 1/
√
δteffexp(
[Φ−1(g(t+ δt))]2/2− (Φ−1(g(t+ δt))−
√
(1 + δteff )Φ−1(g(t)))2/2δteff
) [Drugowitsch et al., 2012]
We decided to simplify the stimulus in order to reduce subjective ambiguity
regarding the importance of each stimulus sample. A stimulus that can
only be clearly to the left or clearly to the right for any given sample puts
the focus in estimating the long-term proportion of right to left samples,
and should result in easier to interpret behavior. The basic behavior of
the[Drugowitsch et al., 2012] model for the standard 2AFC task is also true
when we use our new stimulus, namely that psychometric functions become
sharper (improved performance) and reaction times increase as the cost per
time passing is lowered. We detail the new stimulus and how to turn it into
an optimal belief using Bayesian inference before presenting our modeling
results.
3.3.4.1 New Stimulus
We created a simpler stimulus by sampling each momentary evidence from
a binomial distribution (rather than Gaussian distribution for the classical
random dot visual stimulus assumed in [Drugowitsch et al., 2012], or the
uniform distribution for experiment 2), such that for any one δt, the stimulus
is completely lateralized to one side. The task remains to estimate the mean
bias.
The new stimulus consist on a sequence of sound presentations or "bursts"
of 100 milliseconds duration, each burst fully to the right or to left (|ILD| =
6dB). The time between the onset of one sound presentation and the next
is τ = 250 ms. The full sequence is 7 seconds long, which means there
are 28 total bursts. The sequence is chosen so it contains more bursts to
one side than the other, in one of three different fixed proportions. Leaving
costs aside, the task that the subjects need to solve consists in determining
which is the side that is represented more. But because the subjects are
penalized in time, they can only experience a random sample of the full
sequence before committing to a decision. Therefore, the optimal solution
involves inferring the probability π of the right being the more represented
side. The inference problem can be idealized as the subjects experiencing
Bernoulli samples of the probability π equal to the fixed proportion of right
versus left in the sequence. In other words, it is equivalent to the problem
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of inferring the probability of a Binomial distribution with a limited number
of samples from it.
At any given time t, let us define n̄(t) as the total number of sound
presentations up until that time. Because the interval between bursts is
regular, n̄(t) and t play a completely equivalent role. We define r̄(t) and l̄(t)
as the number of sound presentations to the right and to the left up until
time t respectively. They satisfy n̄ = r̄ + l̄ (in general we will omit the time
dependence).
Let us define the number of perceived observations to the right as r(t)
and to the left as l(t), both real numbers in general. Now let us assume two
situations.
3.3.4.2 Noiseless counting
In this scenario, the subject is able to count perfectly r̄ and l̄, and therefore
r(t) = r̄(t) and l(t) = l̄(t). They are integers that are incremented by 1 or
0 after each observation.
Because we are trying to infer the probability of Binomial distribution,
the posterior probability is going to be a Beta distribution. Therefore is








πα−1(1− π)β−1dπ = Γ(α)Γ(β)Γ(α + β) (3.5)
The parameters α, β ∈ R control the shape of the distribution. From now on
we will choose α = β = 1, which gives rise to a uniform prior distribution.
Under these conditions, the posterior distribution of π given the observations
becomes:
p(π|r, l) = 1
B(r + 1, l + 1) π
r(1− π)l (3.6)
The belief, i.e. the probability of π being greater or equal than 0.5 is
g(r, l) = 1
B(r + 1, l + 1)
∫ 1
0.5
πr(1− π)ldπ = 1− I0.5(r + 1, l + 1) (3.7)
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Where Ix(a, b) is the regularized incomplete Beta function.
The probability of r′(t + τ), i.e. the number of right observations after
the next sound presentation is
p(r′(t+ τ)|r(t), l(t)) =
∫ 1
0
p(π|r, l) [πδ(r′ − r − 1) + (1− π)δ(r′ − r)] dπ
= r + 1
n+ 2δ(r
′ − r − 1) + l + 1
n+ 2δ(r
′ − r − 1) (3.8)
Therefore the belief transition probability g′(r′, l′) is found applying the
mapping in (3.7)
p (g′(r′, l′)|g(r, l)) = r + 1
n+ 2δ (g
′ − g(r + 1, l)) + l + 1
n+ 2δ (g
′ − g(r, l + 1))
(3.9)
3.3.4.3 Noisy Observations
The inference model above depends only on the probability of a right stimu-
lus, π, on the counts experienced to the right so far, and the total counts. As
is typical in decision making research, we are interested in modeling uncer-
tainty in the inference of the bias of the stimulus. To this end, we introduce
"noisy" observations, which can be flipped relatively to the stimulus with a
certain probability α. This noise represents a type of sensory noise, since
each stimulus sample can be occasionally counted to the wrong side. Al-
though we take great care that each stimulus sample is clearly lateralized
to one side, subjects failed to discriminate difficult stimuli perfectly, even
when listening duration was extended to 12 seconds in a binary choice ver-
sion of the task. In fact, performance saturated at around 80 percent for
10 second stimuli. This suggest that such sensory noise, or alternatively
noise in the integration of stimuli is present in the subjects performing this
task ??. We only simulate the sensory noise since this was more straight
forward to derive Bayesian equations for. The noise could be inferred for the
super subject shown by the red trace in ??, by fitting the model such that
it matches the performance of the average subject for varying listening du-
ration in the binary choice configuration. With enough sessions per subject,
this parameter could be fitted for each subject. Other ways to introduce
behavioral variability that were not explored include a soft-max transforma-
tion of the expected reward into action. Our choice of sensory noise results
in the following discrete posterior distribution:
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p(π|n, r) = 1
B(1− α; r + 1, n− r + 1)−B(α; r + 1, n− r + 1)q(π)
r(1−q(π))n−r
(3.10)
where n is the total number of observations and r is the number of observa-
tions to the right, q = α + π(1 − 2α) (the "effective" probability of a right
observation) and B(z; a, b) is the incomplete beta function.
This leads to a belief and belief transition probability:
g(n, r) = I1−α(r + 1, n− r + 1)− I0.5(r + 1, n− r + 1)











where Ix(z, w) is the regularised incomplete beta function and B(a, b) is the
beta function. The full derivation of this formula can be seen below:
The probability of an observation o1 (o1 = 0 left observation, o1 = 0 right observation) given a
certain value of π is:
p(o1|π) =
{
π(1− α) + (1− π)α if o1 = 1
(1− π)(1− α) + πα if o1 = 0
=
{
α+ π(1− 2α) if o1 = 1
1− (α+ π(1− 2α) if o1 = 0
= qo1 (1− q)1−o1
(3.13)
where:
q := α+ π(1− 2α)
For two observations o1 and o2, we obtain:







Generalizing for n observations:





p(o1, o2, ..., on|π) = (α+ π(1− 2α))r(1− α− π(1− 2α))n−r (3.16)
In order to calculate the posterior distribution we need to compute the integral:
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∫ 1
0
p(o1, o2, ..., on|π)p(π)dπ =
∫ 1
0
(α+ π(1− 2α))r(1− α− π(1− 2α))n−rp(π)dπ (3.17)
Using uniform distribution for p(π) and substitution q = α+ π(1− 2α):
∫ 1
0
p(o1, o2, ..., on|π)p(π)dπ =
∫ 1−α
α
qr(1− q)n−rdq = B(1−α; r+ 1, n− r+ 1)−B(α; r+ 1, n− r+ 1)
(3.18)
where B(z; a, b) is the incomplete beta function.
p(π|o1, o2, ..., on) =
1
B(1− α; r + 1, n− r + 1)−B(α; r + 1, n− r + 1)
q(π)r(1− q(π))n−r (3.19)
The belief of the bias being to the right results from integrating the posterior for all the probabilities





B(1− α; r + 1, n− r + 1)−B(α; r + 1, n− r + 1)
(α+ π(1− 2α))r(1− α− π(1− 2α))n−rdπ =
=
1





B(1− α; r + 1, n− r + 1)−B(0.5; r + 1, n− r + 1)
B(1− α; r + 1, n− r + 1)−B(α; r + 1, n− r + 1)
=
I1−α(r + 1, n− r + 1)− I0.5(r + 1, n− r + 1)
I1−α(r + 1, n− r + 1)− Iα(r + 1, n− r + 1)
(3.20)
where Ix(z, w) is the regularised incomplete beta function.
Finally, the belief transition probability is therefore:
p(r′(t+ τ)|n(t), r(t)) =
{∫ 1
0 p(q(π)|n, r) · q(π)dπ if r
′ = r + 1∫ 1



















B(1− α; r′ + 1, n+ 1− r′ + 1)−B(α; r′ + 1, n+ 1− r′ + 1)
B(1− α; r + 1, n− r + 1)−B(α; r + 1, n− r + 1)
=
(
B(r′ + 1, n+ 1− r′ + 1)
B(r + 1, n− r + 1)
)
I1−α(r′ + 1, n+ 1− r′ + 1)− Iα(r′ + 1, n+ 1− r′ + 1)
I1−α(r + 1, n− r + 1)− Iα(r + 1, n− r + 1)
(3.21)
The belief transition probabilities after sampling 5 stimuli compared to after sampling 15 stimuli are
shown below:
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p(g'|g) n=5






































Figure 3.1: Belief transition probabilities after 5 samples of stimulus (left) and
after 15 samples (right). Since the values of belief and probabilities are discrete
and not equally spaced, the "squares" in the plot were scaled to approximately
represent the correct distances in belief space. (the lack of the symmetry that
should exist around 0.5 on both axis is a result of approximating). Colorbar shows
the probability p(g’|g).
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Stimulus vs. Agent Belief
Stimulus
Belief  =0.2
Belief  = 0
































Stimulus vs. Agent Belief
Stimulus
Belief  =0.2
Belief  = 0
Figure 3.2: New stimulus based on a binomial distribution of ILDs. Black dots
represent the stimulus. The green line is an optimal agent’s belief that it is ex-
periencing a right-sided stimulus, p(π ≥ 0.5), given the evidence until that time.
Different difficulties can be created by changing the probability, π, of the stimulus
being on the right, where π values less (greater) than 0.5 have a left (right) bias.
The green line represents the belief resulting from perfect observations (noiseless)
and the dashed grey lines correspond to the belief of 5 different trials with the
same stimulus, but with noisy observations (stimulus can be "flipped" with proba-
bility α = 0.2). After noticing that both easy (top) and a hard (bottom) stimuli can
be generated with the same sampling probability of being right (0.6), we decided to
sample stimuli for the model from this distribution and its left counterpart.
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The new stimulus is shown above, with the resulting Bayesian belief that
the stimulus favors the right side for 5 repeats of the same stimulus with
noiseless inference (3.7) vs noisy inference (3.11). The stimulus is sampled
with a probability of being right of 0.6. For each agent in the modeling
work, 10,000 stimuli were generated, half with probability of being right
of 0.6 (right favoring stimuli) and half with probability 0.4 (left favoring
stimuli), fixing the stimulus noise parameter at α = 0.2. A wide range of
easy and hard stimuli result from this sampling. In order to label the side
and difficulty for a particular trial, we count the actual sampled proportion
of left to right samples with respect to the total number of samples,
(NR −NL)/(NR +NL),
(3.22)
and we use the absolute value of this quantity as measure of difficulty
for the trial independent of side,
|(NR −NL)/(NR +NL)|. (3.23)
For all the results detailed in this section, the value function is always
back-propagated from T=14 seconds, which is much longer than the average
reaction times ( 4 seconds) we are interested in studying. The urgency of
the agent is set with the cost of time. We commonly refer to the concept
of time limit in the analysis. Time limit corresponds to how many times
the total duration of a trial (T) would mean a loss of all possible reward
points. For example, a time limit of 1 means that all possible reward points
are lost at the end of a trial. On the other hand, if the time limit is 4, all
possible reward points would only be lost if the reaction time was four times
the duration of a trial (which is not possible), which means that one fourth
of the points are lost at the end of a trial. Notation: y# means a time limit
of #.
In order to understand the behavior of our embodied agents relative to
the width of the arena, the size of the arena is varied while a unit cost per
action is fixed at 0.01 for all experiments.
On Hesitation and Commitment 73
3 Optimal decision making model for temporally extended actions
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Normative model of the disembodied 2AFC task
We first replicate the main results of [Drugowitsch et al., 2012] for the disem-
bodied task (arena size 3, meaning left, wait, and right states) corresponding
to the classical 2AFC discrimination task, using our own stimulus. Below
we show a disembodied agent that loses all the possible points linearly by
4 seconds, back-propagating the value function from T = 14 seconds. All
figures are labeled according to the time limit by which any positive reward
would be lost given some particular cost per time step (δt = 0.25 seconds).
Reaction times decrease as a function of the stimulus strength (3.23).
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Time Limit =  4
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Figure 3.3: Reaction times of a normative model of the standard 2AFC task with
our stimulus. Top panel: Stronger biases to the left (right) are represented by more
negative (positive) values on the horizontal axis. Bottom panel: left and right trials
are collapsed by taking the absolute value of the difference of the number of right
(NR) and left (NL) counts relative to the total number of counts), the stimulus
strength (3.23). Colorbar represents the conditional probability of the reaction
times given a certain stimulus strength. Black dots represent the mean reaction
time for each bin of stimulus strength. Red line is the linear regression of Reaction
time onto the stimulus strength.
The increase in reaction time with increasing difficulty gets steeper when
difficulty is defined as the absolute mean of only the experienced stimulus.
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Time Limit =  4







































 =  -6.53p=0
Figure 3.4: Reaction time as a function of the absolute experienced stimulus
strength. Colorbar represents the conditional probability of the reaction times given
a certain experienced stimulus strength. Black dots represent the mean reaction
time for each bin of experienced stimulus strength. Red line is the linear regression
of Reaction time onto the experienced stimulus strength.
As in the Drugowitsch and Moreno frameworks [Drugowitsch et al., 2012],
when the cost in time is relaxed, reaction times increase and the agent ex-
periences more evidence, which results in better performance.












































Arena Width =  3
y64  =  -9.39
y32  =  -9.24
y16  =  -8.92
y8  =  -8.11
y4  =  -6.62
y2  =  -4.81
y1  =  -3.28
Figure 3.5: Normative behavior for a single press 2AFC task (arena size 3, mean-
ing left, right and wait states). Left panel: Reaction times increase as the cost of
time is decreased (equivalent to increasing the time limit), error bars denote stan-
dard deviations. Right panel: Psychometric curves sharpen with decreased cost of
time. On both panels, the legend shows the Time Cost converted to the equivalent
time limit y (which is proportional to the time at which a positive score is no
longer possible). The right panel legend additionally shows the slope parameter
for the psychometric curve for each Time Cost.
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Figure 3.6: Proportion of correct responses increases with decreasing time cost
(increasing time limit) whether performance is quantified as a function of the long
term mean of the stimulus, p (left panel), or as a function of the experienced
stimulus (right panel). On both panels, the legend shows the Time Cost converted
to the equivalent time limit y (which is proportional to the time at which a positive
score is no longer possible).
Since in our first two experiments we rewarded subjects as a function of
the stimulus they experienced, rather than on the actual long-term mean of
the stimulus, we also computed the performance of the agent according to
the experienced stimulus. Two main observations can be made. First, for all
time limits performance would be higher if we scored according to the expe-
rienced stimulus up to the time the agent reports her choice. This suggests
that the agent always thinks she is doing better than she actually is when she
answers. Beliefs higher than average might lead to decisions whereas lower
beliefs would lead to waiting, leading to overconfidence. Second, the pattern
of improved performance for longer time limits can also be observed when
quantifying performance in this manner, although the results are noisy. For
this reason we score agent behavior as a function of the long-term mean of
the stimulus (condition), and in our final experiment, described in chapter 4,
we reward subjects according to whether the long-term mean of the stimulus
is positive or negative.
At each time point, the belief for which the expected long-term value of
waiting intersects the expected value of choosing left (right) defines the left
(right) decision boundary. In other words, for each time there exists a belief
for which waiting longer will never result in a higher reward regardless of
how much more certain the agent becomes by doing so, so the agent should
choose according to her present belief at that time.
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Figure 3.7: Value as a function of the agent’s belief. To the left, a slice at t=1 s is
shown, representing the values of waiting (black), choosing left (red) or choosing
right (blue) for all possible beliefs. To the right, the value function is shown for
all times, with larger dots representing the intersection at each time of the curves
of waiting with the ones of moving left (large red dots) and the curves of waiting
with the ones of moving right (large blue dots). These points correspond to the
decision boundaries, where the agent should move left (right) if belief is smaller
(bigger), than the one of the decision boundary. Large green dots correspond to
the intersection of the value curves for moving left and moving right.
These bounds determine the choices for a given stimulus belief, such that
an agent with zero noise in the integration of the stimulus will always have
the same beliefs for repeats of the stimulus, and thus always make the same
choice. However, variance in responses to a fixed stimulus is introduced by
the noise parameter α.
As previously described [Drugowitsch et al., 2012], decision boundaries
on the agent’s belief collapse later as the cost of time decreases (time limit,
y, increases), which increases reaction times and improves performance.
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Figure 3.8: Time evolution of decision boundaries in belief space for different
time limits. The decision boundaries collapse in time. The distance between the
bounds widens as the cost of time is decreased (time limit, y, is increased). Each
pair of mirrored lines represents the threshold or decision bound that the agent’s
belief must cross at each time in order to make a choice for a particular time limit
imposed by a cost for time passing. The legend shows the Time Cost converted to
the equivalent time limit y (which is proportional to the time at which a positive
score is no longer possible).
3.4.2 Normative model of our embodied 2AFC task,
fixing arena width and time limit parameters
We next characterize the behavior of a normative agent that must make
several moves in order to report a choice, and then show what happens to
the bounds as we move from the disembodied task to the embodied task.
As before, we first show behavior for a fixed time limit of 4, and then for a
range of time costs as before, except now the number of presses necessary
to reach either side is fixed at 8 (arena size = 2*8 (sides) + 1 (center) =
17). Left and right stimuli have been collapsed using (3.23) so that higher
values mean easier stimuli. As with the disembodied agent from Figure 4.2,
reaction times decrease as the difficulty of the stimulus decreases (higher
absolute mean ILD). As the difficulty of the stimulus increases, the agent
also uses a significantly higher number of presses to report its choice.
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Time Limit =  4
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Figure 3.9: Left panel: Number of presses as a function of stimulus strength, for
an arena width of 17. The colour scale represents the number of counts and is
logarithmic. Black dots represent the mean number of presses for each bin of
stimulus strength. Red line is the linear regression of Number of Presses onto
Stimulus Strength. Right panel: Reaction times as a function of stimulus strength
for an arena width of 17. The colour scale represents the conditional probability of
the reaction times given a certain stimulus strength. Black dots represent the mean
reaction time for each bin of stimulus strength. Red line is the linear regression
of Reaction time onto Stimulus Strength.
While the decrease in mean RT appears to be more robust (larger coef-
ficient), there is a significant dependence of the total number or presses on
the difficulty of the task. It is clear from the figure that the easiest stimuli
get resolved with the minimum number of presses, whereas harder stimuli
can elicit more than twice that.
Remarkably for our investigation, the raw agent behavior in the arena
for easy versus a harder stimulus can be qualitatively similar to the phe-
nomenology we observed in experiments 1 and 2.
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Figure 3.10: Normative agent trajectories for an arena of width 17, back-
propagation from 14 seconds, unit cost per action 0.01 with stimulus noise α = 0.2
for an easy (left) and a hard (right) trial. Black dots on the borders of each plot
show the stimulus, and thin red line the corresponding Bayesian belief. A thick
red (blue) line on the left (right) plot shows the decision trajectory of the agent
for one presentation of that stimulus.
3.4.3 Decision bounds for the embodied normative agent
reflect the agent’s commitment to a choice
We begin by showing the action value intersections defining the decision
bounds for the disembodied agent of (Figure 3.7), but for the embodied
agent with arena width x17. The embodied action bounds to move one step
to the right or left from x = 0 are more narrow relative to the disembodied
decision bounds to choose left or right, however, whereas the disembodied
agent reports her final choice after taking one action to either side, the
embodied agent encounters another decision bound. These new decision
bounds have the interesting property that the mid-point belief g = 0.5 is
closer to the bound on the side of the direction that the agent moved. That
is, it takes less extreme values of belief to the left (right) to make an action
to the left (right) for an agent that is on the left (right) side of the arena.
The bounds change with the agent’s position, making the left (right) actions
more valuable as the agent moves left (right), resulting in a positive feedback
loop that eventually commits the agent to choose left (right) when the value
of the waiting state no longer surpasses that of either bound. This occurs
when the left and right bound touch or collapse. At this time, the agent
is forced to commit to whatever side she is closest too. The collapse of
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the bounds can be seen in the figure below, at the time-step where only a
green dot but no red or blue dots (the bounds) are present anymore. The
time step immediately before that is last step at which the agent still has
time to make it to either side before her points run out. We call this final
set of bounds denoting non-reversible actions, hard bounds, and they have
the same categorical nature of the disembodied bounds that commits agents
to their choices. In contrast, bounds encountered before this time step, at
which the agent can still delay her final choice to either side by one more
time-step, we call soft bounds. The difference between soft and hard bounds
is by definition, since the bounds are derived directly from the values of each
potential action (left, right, wait). Crossing a soft bound in general leads
the agent to encounter a new set of bounds, however, the hard bound is the
bound collapse, which is the moment for which there remains only sufficient
time to reach the closest target. For an agent in the center, the hard bound
collapses at 0.5, so the agent will immediately begin to move to the side that
her belief favors. Although it is difficult to conceive an analysis that finds
these bounds from behavior rather than action values, the consequence of
the hard bounds is an agent that at some point must commit to one side or
the other. This inspired the final analysis of the thesis, where we quantify
probabilities of moving left, waiting, or moving right as a function of the
stimulus evidence, for different times and locations in the arena 4.31.
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Figure 3.11: Value function for all times and for current positions (a)x=-4,
(b)x=0, (c)x=4, for an arena width of 17, cost of movement 0.01, cost of time
0.018 and back-propagation from 14 seconds. Small red, blue and black dots rep-
resent the values of moving left, moving right and waiting at the current position,
respectively. The larger dots represent the intersection at each time of the curves
of waiting with the ones of moving left (large red dots) and the curves waiting
with the ones of moving right (large blue dots). Large green dots correspond to
the intersection of the curves of moving left and moving right. When the agent’s
belief hits the left (right) bound at the initial position, x = 0, she moves to x = -1
(x=1). Note the value of waiting at x = -4 (x = 4) marked by the green dots is
closer to the red (blue) dots denoting the left (right) bound.
3.4.4 Reliability: Trajectories for repeated presenta-
tions of the same stimulus
The trajectories of the agent are fully determined by the bounds and her
beliefs. This means that for noise-less inference on the integrated stimulus
(α = 0), repeating the same stimulus results in the exact same trajectory
output by the model. However, noise in the memory of the integrator causes
slight differences in the beliefs of the agent, causing slight differences in
the output trajectories when beliefs are allowed to vary with α on a trial
by trial basis. This results in qualitatively similar trajectories for repeated
presentations of the exact same stimulus. Below we show the responses to
repeated presentations of easy stimuli (Figure 3.12) and for hard stimuli
(Figure 3.13) with and without noise.
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Figure 3.12: Trajectories for 5 repetitions of an easy stimulus and the resulting
beliefs (left panels) and trajectories (right panels). Easy stimuli result in identical
trajectories for both noiseless (top) and noisy (bottom) integration. Black dots on
the borders of each plot show the stimulus. On the left plots, dashed colored lines
show the Bayesian beliefs for repeated presentations of the stimulus. Thick colored
lines on the right side plot shows the decision trajectories of the agent elicited by
the beliefs on the left plots.
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Figure 3.13: Trajectories for 5 repetitions of a hard stimulus and the resulting
beliefs (left panels) and trajectories (right panels). For noiseless integration tra-
jectories are identical (top), however with noisy integration (bottom panels) some
variability in the output trajectory is introduced the more variable the early part
of the stimulus. Black dots on the borders of each plot show the stimulus. On the
left plots, dashed colored lines show the Bayesian beliefs for repeated presentations
of the stimulus. Thick colored lines on the right side plot shows the decision tra-
jectories of the agent elicited by the beliefs on the left plots. Trajectories remain
strikingly qualitatively similar.
The beliefs and trajectories are shown together for repeats of a stimulus
on a single plot below.
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Figure 3.14: Normative agent trajectories for an arena of width 17, time limit
4, unit cost per action 0.01 with stimulus noise α = 0.2 for 5 repeats of an
easy stimulus (left) and a hard stimulus (right).The red thin lines represent the
evolution of belief in the different trials, while blue lines of varying markers denote
trajectories that end in the right (figure top) side. Red color likewise denotes
trajectories that ended on the left.
3.4.5 Varying Time Cost with Fixed Arena Width
For a fixed arena width of 17, the influence of varying costs of time was
tested. Reaction times are not as useful to describe the behavior of embodied
agents, as they are not revealing of the performance of the agent or the shape
of her choice trajectories. We define hesitation as the number of presses
used by the agent divided by the minimum number of presses required to
report a choice, and found this to be a better indicator of the complexity
of the decision trajectories. We also define other observable signatures of
the behavior such as start-time (the time at which the first move is made)
and of Post-start waits (the number of times that the agent waits instead
of moving after her first move). All of these quantities appear to change
monotonically as time cost is increased, except for Post-start waiting, which
is small for small time costs (large arenas), then increases as time cost is
increased (arena size decreased), and then decreases for very large time costs
(very small arenas) (Figure 3.17). This non-monoticity is the first indication
that in the model, hesitation or related behaviors might be only observed
for very particular regimes of cost. This will become clearer in the analysis
by arena width (Figure 3.22).
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Arena Width =  17
y64  =  -8.25
y32  =  -8.17
y16  =  -7.93
y8  =  -7.52
y4  =  -6.6
y2  =  -4.85
y1  =  -3.5
Figure 3.15: Psychometric curves for different costs of time/time limits. The
legend shows the Time Cost converted to the equivalent time limit y (which is
proportional to the time at which a positive score is no longer possible), and the






































Figure 3.16: Proportion of correct responses as a function of the time cost. In the
left panel, the accuracy of responses is evaluated according to the whole stimulus,
while in the right panel it is evaluated according to the section of the stimulus
experienced by the agent until the moment of their final choice. The legend shows
the Time Cost converted to the equivalent time limit y (which is proportional to
the time at which a positive score is no longer possible).
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Figure 3.17: Signatures of the behaviour of the embodied agent for fixed arena
width of 17 and α = 0.2 and varying time costs/limits. Error bars show standard
deviations. The legend shows the Time Cost converted to the equivalent time limit
y (which is proportional to the time at which a positive score is no longer possible)
We next explore whether the bias to the bound as a function of the
agent’s position that we saw in (Figure 3.7) is general across different time
cost regimes (time limits). We find that indeed the bounds change with
the agent’s position, making the left (right) actions more valuable as the
agent moves left (right), resulting in a positive feedback loop that eventually
commits the agent to choose left (right). Increasing time pressure (reducing
the time limit) on the bounds has a shrinking effect on the bounds, making
them less wide at each time-step.
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Figure 3.18: The left (right) panel shows the action bounds to move one step left
or right for all times at position x = -1 (x = 1). Color code denotes the bounds
for different time limits, for an arena of size x = 17 and stimulus noise parameter
α = 0.2. As the time limit increases, the bounds get wider. Note that for all
time limits, the beliefs necessary to move left (right) indicated by the bottom (top)
bound are closer (further) to a fully ambiguous belief of 0.5. Previous movements
to the left (right) of the center of the arena makes the left (right) actions more
valuable, resulting in a positive feedback loop that biases and eventually commits
the agent to the left (right). The legend shows the Time Cost converted to the
equivalent time limit y (which is proportional to the time at which a positive score
is no longer possible)
3.4.6 Performance of the embodied vs disembodied
agent for fixed arena width and varying time
limit parameters
We computed psychometric curves to assess the performance of the norma-
tive agent for the same arena width, while varying the time limit (arena
length y). We find that for the same time costs (time limits), the embod-
ied agent has and the disembodied agent have overall similar psychometric
curves, with perhaps sharper slopes for the embodied agent for smaller time
limits, but the opposite is true for larger time limits. Performance as a func-
tion of arena width and time limit (cost) will be analyzed systematically in
(Figure 3.24).
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Arena Width =  3
y64  =  -9.39
y32  =  -9.24
y16  =  -8.92
y8  =  -8.11
y4  =  -6.62
y2  =  -4.81
y1  =  -3.28
















Arena Width =  17
y64  =  -8.25
y32  =  -8.17
y16  =  -7.93
y8  =  -7.52
y4  =  -6.6
y2  =  -4.85
y1  =  -3.5
Figure 3.19: Psychometric curves for a disembodied agent (left panel) vs an em-
bodied agent (right panel) for the same costs of time (time limits y). The legend
shows the Time Cost converted to the equivalent time limit y (which is propor-
tional to the time at which a positive score is no longer possible), and the slope
parameter for the psychometric curve for each time limit.
3.4.7 Embodied normative agent behavior for varying
arena widths and fixed time limit parameters
In order to quantify the effect of arena width on the behaviour of the agent,
the cost of time was fixed at 0.018 (equivalent to 14 seconds time limit) and
the width of the arena was varied (e.g. the minimum number of presses
required to report a decision). We found that small arenas allow agents to
commit later relative to the disembodied task, and make corrections, giving
rise to hesitant choice trajectories. Larger arena widths force the agent
to begin moving earlier and commit to wrong choices, causing a drop in
performance observed in the psychometric curves.
On Hesitation and Commitment 90
3 Optimal decision making model for temporally extended actions
















Arena Width =  111
x3  =  -6.57
x5  =  -6.55
x7  =  -6.66
x9  =  -6.71
x11  =  -6.56
x21  =  -6.2
x31  =  -5.84
x41  =  -5.41
x51  =  -4.93
x61  =  -4.61
x71  =  -4
x81  =  -3.55
x91  =  -2.97
x101  =  -2.16
x111  =  0.21
Figure 3.20: Performance for our task going from the standard single press 2AFC
task (x3) to two press (x5) and larger arenas. Small embodied arenas have similar
performance as the standard 2AFC task, with perhaps a small improvement for
size (x7) and (x9) but for larger arenas performance drops sharply. The legend





















































Figure 3.21: Proportion of correct responses as a function of the arena width with
a fixed time limit of 4 (time cost = 0.018). In the left panel, the accuracy of
responses is evaluated according to the whole stimulus, while in the right panel
it is evaluated according to the section of the stimulus experienced by the agent
until the moment of their final choice. For both panels, the legend shows the arena
width.
We plot the signatures of behavior (Reaction time, hesitation, start mov-
ing time and post-start waiting vs the different time costs) (Figure 3.22) for
the agents of (Figure 3.20), with fixed time limit of 14 with noise parameter
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α = 0.2 and varying arena widths.













































































































































Figure 3.22: Signatures of the behavior of the embodied agents from (Figure 3.20)
for fixed time limit of 14 and α = 0.2 and varying arena widths. Error bars show
standard deviations. For all panels, the legend shows the arena width.
As the size of the arena grows from the disembodied to the smallest
embodied arenas (x5, x7), Reaction Times don’t change much, but Start
Time decreases and Hesitation (number of presses/required) increases as
does Post-Start Waiting. These changes in behavior are accompanied by an
increase in the percentage of correct responses relative to the experienced
stimulus. Further increasing the width of the arena causes Start Times to
drop, but then it remains the same for a large range of arena widths (x9-
x91). Similarly, Post Start waiting increases for the next two arena sizes
(x9-x11), but then plateaus for a large range of arenas (x11-x61). Percent-
age of correct responses and the slope of the psychometric curve also show
a minor improvement in performance for (x7-x9) arena widths relative to
smaller arenas, but then plateau and remain unchanged for a large range of
arenas(x11-x61). Hesitation also increases at first with further increases in
arena width, and reaches a peak for arena size x11, and then decays smoothly
as we further increase arena width. Very large arenas (>x61) cause a drop in
Post-Start Waiting and percentage of correct responses as well as a flattening
of the psychometric curve. The largest arena sizes (x101-x111) push Start
Times to δt, Post-Start waiting to zero, and Hesitation disappears (Number
of Presses/required = 1), and performance drops to chance level. This indi-
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cates that the arena is so large that given the time limit, the agent doesn’t
have time to integrate any evidence and acts on her first guess (Figure 3.22).
This non-monotony of the hesitation behaviors, best appreciated in Number
of Presses/required and in Average of Post-Start waits, is theoretical evi-
dence that the hesitation requires very specific environmental conditions to
occur.
Finally we observe what happens to the decision bounds as we increase
the width of the arena. Whereas increasing arena length (increasing time
limit) had a widening effect on the bounds (Figure 3.18), increasing arena


































































Figure 3.23: The left (right) panel shows the action bounds to move one step left
or right for all times at position x = -1 (x = 1). Color code denotes the bounds
for different arena widths, for fixed time limit 14 and stimulus noise parameter
α = 0.2. As the arena width increases, the bounds collapse earlier while main-
taining their width. Note that as observed in (Figure 3.18), for all time limits,
the beliefs necessary to move left (right) indicated by the bottom (top) bound are
closer (further) to a fully ambiguous belief of 0.5. Previous movements to the
left (right) of the center of the arena makes the left (right) actions more valuable,
resulting in a positive feedback loop that biases and eventually commits the agent
to the left (right). For all panels, the legend shows the arena width.
In (Figure 3.18) we learned that increasing the cost of time (decreasing
time limit) causes the soft bounds to narrow, such that less extreme beliefs
are required for the agent to move rather than wait. Meanwhile, increasing
the width of the arena shifts the hard bounds or bound collapse to earlier
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times (Figure 3.23). Finally, (Figure 3.12 and 3.13) showed that the agent’s
actions are deterministic at each position and time in the arena with respect
to fixed beliefs, but noise in the beliefs introduces variability in behavior.
3.4.8 Embodied normative agent behavior for varying
arena widths and varying time limit parameters
We next confirm that the results described in (Figure 3.22) generalize to
other time limits. In general, as the time limit (y) increases we also observe
increasing start times and the percentage of correct responses increases as
well. This behavior is similar to that of the disembodied agent. Our novel
finding is that small arenas allow the agent to delay her choice by moving to
non-terminal states in addition to waiting. The hesitation behavior charac-
terized by Number of presses / required presses is strongest for small arena
widths and time limits. In our human experiments conducted in parallel
with this work, pilot trials were used to decide on a time limit y of 7 seconds
and arena width x17. This arena size is part of the maximum Hesitation re-
gion in the model. As arena sizes grow sufficiently large, hesitation behavior
and Post-Start waiting disappear, Start times drop to δt and performance
drops to chance level for all time limits simulated.
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Figure 3.24: Signatures of the behavior for a range of arena widths, time limits,
and noise parameter α = 0.2. The color code is in the scale of each plot’s y-limits.
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While the effects of increasing arena width (X) at fixed cost of time (T)
and the effects of increasing T at fixed arena width appear equivalent at the
level of the psychometric (decreased performance), these two parameters
have differential effects at the level of the decision bounds, which ultimately
determine behavior. Although it may be possible mathematically relate one
summary statistic of behavior such as percentage of correct responses to
some relation between X and T, in general X and T have different effects
across different signatures of behavior.
Interestingly, the signatures of behavior we think of as being most indica-
tive of a lack of commitment to an initial choice (Hesitation = N presses/Required
and Post-start waiting) are non-monotonic. The justification for the trends
of both signatures of behavior should be the same, but they present dif-
ferent shapes of curves (post-start waiting increases faster as time pressure
increases from low values than hesitation). This is due to the costs of move-
ment, which justify that the agent, when time pressured not to do only direct
trajectories, should prioritize waiting rather than moving hesitantly to avoid
the costs of movement. The low values of hesitation and post-start waiting
for both small arenas in T and X can be explained by the fact that, when
the time pressure is very low or the arena is small enough, it is optimal to
perform only direct trajectories when certain, rather than hesitating. When
time pressure increases (either by increasing T or X), the agent has now to
start moving earlier and, when presented with contradictory evidence, ei-
ther hesitating or waiting (thus increasing these signatures). At some point
(which is different for waiting and hesitation for reasons explained above),
the agent is so time pressured and/or the arena is so large, that she has
to move directly and as soon as possible to the terminal points, therefore
decreasing hesitation or post-start waiting.
3.4.9 Discussion
The major phenomenology observed in our experiments is that difficult trials
elicit long decision trajectories (Figure 2.9 and 2.18), and that these trajec-
tories appear to be time locked to the stimulus as seen in our analysis of
Experiment 2 (Figure 2.21). Although this result suggests that the shape of
the trajectories may contain information about an evolving decision variable
during the trial, that analysis fails to incorporate how subjects’ instanta-
neous movements are affected by their intended target, as well as their past
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movements. To overcome this limitation we adopted a normative frame-
work in which trajectories are considered optimal solutions to the problem
of moving in a 2D environment towards one of two possible target locations.
In each trial, a noisy time-varying sensory stream indicates which of the two
locations will be rewarded, thus biasing the agent’s trajectory. The opti-
mization problem includes not only the reward associated with finding the
correct location on each trial, but also costs associated with movement and
time. We implemented this model by generalizing a similar approach used
investigate the cost of time during evidence accumulation in a disembod-
ied setting [Drugowitsch et al., 2012]. We tackle this reinforcement learning
problem by numerically solving a Bellman equation in a state-space defined
by time (within a trial), the agent’s instantaneous belief about the correct
choice, and its physical parameters. A major difference between the model
and subject behavior in all of our experiments is that the model’s actions
are time locked to the stimulus, whereas the humans are free to move at any
time, and successive moves are only constrained by the subject’s own speed.
We also implemented a model with the freedom to make several moves per
time-step, but went forward with the simpler model without the extra refrac-
tory period parameter. This model’s behavior was conceptually very similar
to our first velocity constrained model attempting to simulate the arm based
task. We observe regimes of cost parameters for which the optimal agent
loosely tracks the stimulus (Figure 3.10). Our agent moves when her beliefs
cross action thresholds (Figure 3.11), not unlike the bounds of the drift diffu-
sion framework [Ratcliff, 1978], but in our framework new bounds on belief
are encountered at each time and space in the task. The agent will move
left (right) exactly one grid over to that side if her belief on the stimulus has
crossed the left (right) decision bound, otherwise she will wait at her current
spot. This model allows us to understand the actions of the agent in terms of
their values to the agent. The agent is always comparing the long-term value
of acting anytime later in the trial with the values of her immediate options
available. This type of normative framework has been proposed before to ex-
plain down the middle reach trajectories [Haith et al., 2015]. In that work,
the authors provide experimental and theoretical evidence that intermedi-
ate movements do not result from involuntary averaging between parallel
motor plans, but instead are the result of an optimal calculation involving
cognitive and motor constraints [Haith et al., 2015]. Their experiment is a
go-before you know task, where reaction times are pushed to be very small
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by placing explicit timing constraints similar to those we used in Experiment
2. Haith studied the effect of the distance between the targets on the tra-
jectory decisions, and found that the incidence of intermediate movements
depends on the target jump amplitude, with bigger amplitudes resulting
in fewer intermediate amplitudes [Haith et al., 2015]. Another recent study
similarly used a normative model of an embodied tasks in order to argue that
intermediate movements result from purposeful planning which flexibly se-
lects a single motor plan to maximize task success [Wong and Haith, 2017].
The effect of motor effort on changes of mind had been previously inves-
tigated by Burk [Burk et al., 2014]. The same group also recently used
dynamic programming to model the change of mind and double change
of mind phenomenology [Van Den Berg et al., 2016]. This last effort con-
cludes rational decision makers adjust the bounds for the second decision of
a double-decision task if there is a cost associated with the passage of time
[Van Den Berg et al., 2016]. We too investigate a motor component to deci-
sion making using normative models, however our focus in on the geometric
aspect is more similar to the work of [Haith et al., 2015]. However, as pre-
viously done by Drugowitsch and colleagues [Drugowitsch et al., 2012], we
also investigate the effect of time systematically. Our focus on time and the
sequential nature of behavior perhaps makes our study closest to the study
of Vanden Berg [Van Den Berg et al., 2016]. With our model we described
the effect of the time cost (Figure 3.18) and arena width (Figure 3.23) on
the decision bounds at each time step of a multi-step decision, and ulti-
mately the resulting behavior for a wide range of time-cost and arena sizes
(Figure 3.24), while a controlled stochastic stimulus is presented through
the entire duration of each trial. Our study combines elements from both
of [Haith et al., 2015] and [Van Den Berg et al., 2016], providing a unified
framework for the study of choice behavior in 2D embodied settings. Al-
though a link to confidence has been made between the optimal model’s be-
liefs and embodied actions, we do not explore confidence in our model. One
of the most important aspects of the problem we studied is that it requires
precise fine-tuning of the task conditions. This is evidenced by the difficulty
in capturing hesitant behavior in experiment 1. The modeling work allows
us to see that hesitation only occurs between the two asymptotic behaviors
of the arenas (wide or long). The extreme shaped arenas don’t give rise to
hesitation and interesting trajectories, it is only in the intermediate regime
where -for a given cost of time - the agent needs to start early, but still
On Hesitation and Commitment 98
3 Optimal decision making model for temporally extended actions
has enough room to change if her early choice was premature, one observes
patterned trajectories. In the model, hesitation is greatest for arena widths
between 10 and 20. This can be observed in the top right panel of (Figure
3.22) and in the top left panel of (Figure 3.24). We think these figures ex-
plain the phenomenon we have been studying in our psychophysical work.
In experiment 1, lack of time pressure for the time-scale of the stimulus we
used resulted in little hesitation. In experiment 2, we increased the number
of hesitant trajectories by imposing time pressure at start times. We use
the simplified model to learn the ideal range to observe hesitant behavior,
and used these observations to guide pilot experiments for this new task
described in Chapter 4. Anecdotally, as in the model no large differences in
the pattern of presses were seen in the arenas that had 7, 8, or 9 in human
subjects. However, subjects didn’t hesitate much for smaller arenas (e.g. 3
steps to each side) whereas the agent shows hesitation even for the smallest
arenas. Model fitting was not an explicit goal of this analysis. Our initial
goal was showing that such optimal consideration of space, in addition to
temporal, constraints could generate in-between trajectories, in order to ex-
plore the range or parameters and inform the design of the final subject task.
Model fitting might still be performed in the future either in the described
model or in a non-dynamic programming version of the normative agent.
Other more complex models were explored, but abandoned early as the idea
of sequences of button presses was adopted. In the following chapter, we
adapt our decision making task to be consistent with the rules of the envi-
ronment of our embodied agent, using the arena sizes that maximize hesitant
behavior in the model to guide the design of the subject task.
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Chapter 4
A sequential decision making
task for studying temporally
extended actions
HIGHLIGHTS
• In this chapter we describe our final experiment, where the
stimulus has been greatly simplified in order to reduce ambi-
guity regarding the subjective contribution of each stimulus
sample, and human subjects now control the cursor with
button presses in order to simplify the motor component of
our task.
• As in our previous tasks and our model, average trajectory
length increases significantly with increasing stimulus diffi-
culty.
• Inter press interval decreases with increasing stimulus diffi-
culty.
• Responses to repeated presentations of the same stimulus
result in similar responses on different trials.
• Signatures of spatial and temporal dependence of actions can
be observed in this task.
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4.1 Abstract
Our previous theoretical work showed us that modifying the cost of accu-
mulating evidence framework [Drugowitsch et al., 2012] to include a simple
geometric cost for moving can result in agents that display hesitant decision
trajectories. The discrete actions depending on nothing but an assumed cost
per moving one unit step can be representative of human subjects pressing
either of 2 buttons, and accordingly in this chapter we changed the input to
our task from joystick movement to button presses. In addition to changing
the motor input to the task, we also mimicked the cost of time of the model
by presenting human subjects with clear visual feedback to inform subjects
of their position in the arena, how much time remains, and the points lost
due to having a constant cost for time passing. Subjects in our final experi-
ment continue to display hesitant choice trajectories, and as in our previous
experiments we find that harder stimuli are associated to longer choice tra-
jectories. Analysis of the choice trajectories reveal stereotyped responses at
the level of the time interval between presses, and also higher correlations
between responses to repeats of the same stimulus when compared to re-
sponses to non-identical stimuli sampled from the same distribution. An
effect of time passing on subject responses is present at the level of inter-
press-intervals, which are slightly but significantly faster as the trial duration
increases. Our models predict that the coupling between the stimulus and
subject responses should become weaker in time, as agents eventually com-
mit to the targets that they are closer to, regardless of what new evidence
is presented to the agent.
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4.2 Introduction
Although we were able to collect decision trajectories that were correlated
to our stochastic stimulus in Experiment 2, accurate modeling of an optimal
agent capable of displaying such trajectories became computationally pro-
hibitive. Our modeling work allowed us to understand the role of time pres-
sure in creating the environmental circumstances for which optimal agents
hesitate. We realize it would be necessary to have a tighter control of the
subjects’ urgency to respond. To this end, we designed a follow up exper-
iment where subject performance was explicitly linked to a point system,
with rewards for correct responses and point reductions proportional to the
passage of time. In this new task, subjects are told that the aim is to collect
a point reward by moving a cursor in a grid to the corresponding target
area. The reward is temporally discounted, and clearly indicated to the hu-
man subjects with feedback both online and during the inter-trial-interval.
Subjects displace the cursor by one unit to the left (right) by pressing the
left (right) button, which eliminated the need for modeling the derivatives of
displacement and standardized responses across subjects. We also took this
opportunity to simplify the stimulus in order to reduce subjective ambiguity
regarding the contribution of each stimulus sample, which we changed to be
binary (left or right) by eliminating small or zero ILD values. All of these
changes allowed us to provide a data set in which subjects behave quali-
tatively similar to our optimal agents to Chapter 3. The use of repeated
stimuli at random also allows us to quantify the degree to which subjects
respond similarly to the same stimulus. This chapter provides a detailed
quantification of subject behavior in Experiment 3.
4.3 Methods
4.3.1 Task
As in Chapter 3, the task is now to resolve the bias (left or right) of the
stimulus before the time limit, and in view of temporally discounted rewards.
The action space was modified such that subjects now move left or right by
pressing one of two buttons at a time. However, unlike the model of Chapter
3, subjects are not limited to one button press per sample of stimulus, and
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are free to move left or right as fast as they want, one press at a time. The
task is self-initiated by pressing (and releasing) the left and right button
simultaneously, which triggers a random delay of 500 ms - 1000 ms, after
which the trial and the stimulus start. The trial ends when subjects reach
one of the two distally separated targets (or walls), or when the time limit
is reached. A cursor is displayed and automatically moved upwards towards
an upper bound at constant speed, signaling the time and points remaining.
The cursor itself fills up with a different color to convey the same information
about time in the task.
4.3.2 New Stimulus
In this experiment, we used the stimulus described in the modeling chapter
(3.3.4.1). Initially, 10,000 stimuli were created by setting p = 0.6 for gen-
erating a right favoring sample, and left stimuli were created by mirroring
the right stimuli. However, since sampling with a probability of 0.6 does
not necessarily result in right favoring stimulus sequences over the entire
duration of the stimulus( 28 samples or 7 seconds), 6 different difficulty con-
ditions were created by selecting stimuli with specific proportions of left to
right samples over the 7 seconds of stimulus. A total of 9 unique leftward
stimuli were kept per session (3 per each of the 3 different left difficulties),
and mirrored for the left. Each session used a different seed for the first 5
sessions over one week, and the seeds were repeated on the second week. See
(4.3.5) Subjects and Sampling Procedure for more details.
4.3.3 Pilot 2AFC Fixed Duration Experiment
In order to confirm that the discrimination of this stochastic stimulus is an
integration task, we ran a series of standard 2AFC fixed duration experi-
ments, progressively allowing subjects to experience the stimulus for shorter
durations. We expect the sessions with longer durations to have better per-
formance, and this is indeed what we saw.
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Figure 4.1: Fixed duration 2AFC experiments. We tested 6 naive subjects (all
different from the main experiment subjects), with only the hard conditions, p =
0.6 (Right Stimulus) and p = 0.4 (Left Stimulus), at different fixed durations of 1,
2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9 , and 12 seconds in separate session blocks of 40 trials per duration
with a break in between. As expected, as subjects were allowed to experience shorter
stimuli their accuracy decreased
.
4.3.4 Temporally Discounted Reward
Aside from the changes in the stimulus, we also thought it necessary to set
an explicit cost for waiting in the psychophysics task to match the type of
costs imposed on the model. We put a constant cost per unit of time, which
results in an accumulated cost for waiting that grows linearly in time. We
set this quantity such that the accumulated time cost would match the total
rewards by the end of the task. Theoretically, subtracting this cost from the
monotonically growing value of the expected reward in time (as the subjects
become more certain), this should result in an expected value for completing
the task that reaches its maximum value sometime in the middle of the task.
A schematic of this reward system is shown below (Figure 4.2).
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Figure 4.2: This is a schematic of the expected reward, which grows in time as
subjects accumulate more evidence and increase their probability of answering cor-
rectly (top), a constant time cost which results in a linearly accumulating point
reduction (middle), and the addition of these two quantities resulting in the ex-
pected value for completing the task as a function of time (bottom).
4.3.5 Subjects and Experimental Procedure
A total of 4 subjects completed the entire experiment, following 1 training
session. In order to assess the reliability of the responses to a specific stim-
ilus, we repeated stimuli in a random way to ensure subjects didn’t realized
they were listening to the same stimulus. Each week subjects were asked to
complete 5 sessions (one per day) of 72 trials each. Each session consisted
of 18 unique stimuli (9 unique stimuli to the right were created and then
flipped to make the left stimuli), and each was repeated 4 times per session
in a random order. Subjects completed 10 sessions across 2 weeks, and the
exact stimuli and order or week 1 were repeated on week 2, by setting a
unique random seed for each day of the week. Subjects were explicitly asked
at the end of the entire experiment if they noticed the repeats, and none
reported having noticed. In total, each particular stimulus was experienced
8 times per subject. This resulted in 90 unique sequences (45 to the right
mirrored for the left conditions, with 8 repetitions per sequence), totalling
720 trials per subject. Sample responses for 4 subjects and all repeats of
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some sample stimuli are shown in (Figure 4.3).
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Figure 4.3: Stimulus Repeats. Top panel: Each column shows a unique leftward
stimulus and 8 responses from each subject. Each row shows a different subject.
Bottom panel: Mirrored rightward stimuli. Black dots on each plot denote the
stimulus. Blue (red) colored trajectories end on the right (left).
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4.4 Results
4.4.1 Task Stability
Percentage correct, Scored Points, and Reaction times do not trend across
sessions, suggesting performance is stable across sessions for all 4 subjects.
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Figure 4.4: Scored Points (top row), Percentage correct (middle row), and Reac-
tion times (bottom row) are plotted against session number for all subjects in order
to investigate whether any linear trends exist, which would suggest learning is still
ongoing. No such trends can be detected at a significance of α = 0.5, suggesting
performance is stable across sessions. Error bars show standard deviations.
4.4.2 Accuracy
Psychometric curves for 4 subjects are shown below, defining conditions
according to the long-term mean of the stimulus.
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Figure 4.5: Psychometric curves for 4 subjects evaluating performance according
to the long-term mean of the stimulus. Thin black lines show performance for each
of the 10 sessions of 72 trials, thick red lines show average psychometric over all
720 trials for each subject. Red to blue graded circles show session performance
for 6 difficulty conditions.
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Figure 4.8: Average psychometric curve for 4 subjects evaluating performance
according to the mean of the experienced the stimulus. Thin black lines show
performance for each subject over 720 trials, thick red lines shows the mean for
all subjects. Red to blue graded circles show session performance for 6 difficulty
conditions.
4.4.3 Reaction Times
Reaction times for 4 subjects increase as a function of the difficulty of the
experienced stimulus.
On Hesitation and Commitment 116
4 A sequential decision making task for studying temporally extended actions
Reaction Time vs Experienced Difficulty
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Reaction Time vs Experienced Difficulty
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Reaction Time vs Experienced Difficulty
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Reaction Time vs Experienced Difficulty
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Figure 4.9: Reaction times for 4 subjects decrease as the mean of the experienced
stimulus increases (task becomes easier) (3.23). Black dots show mean reaction
times for each difficulty bin, red line shows the linear fit of RT onto stimulus
difficulty, and the color bar the counts of RT for each bin.
In order to compute the mean reaction time vs stimulus difficulty we
collapse all subject reaction time data without normalization. The choice
of not normalizing is due to the similarity in shape and magnitude of the
reaction time distributions across subjects,
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Reaction Time vs Experienced Difficulty
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Figure 4.10: Reaction times decrease as the mean of the experienced stimulus
increases (task becomes easier) (3.23). 2280 trials collapsed across all 4 subjects.
Black dots show mean reaction times for each difficulty bin, red line shows the




The main feature observed throughout our experiments is that the decision
trajectory length increases as the stimulus becomes hard, and the model
predicts that we should continue to observe this behavior with discrete but-
ton press input to the task - for a range of time costs. In our new task, the
number of presses increases as a function of the difficulty of the experienced
stimulus for all 4 subjects (Figure 4.11). We used 7 seconds and an arena of
width x17, parameters that were in the region of maximum Hesitation for
the model and worked well in pilot experiments.
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Trajectory Length vs Experienced Difficulty
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Figure 4.11: The number of presses across all 4 subjects increases with increasing
difficulty of the experienced stimulus (3.23 −→ 0). Black dots show mean Number
of Presses for each difficulty bin, red line shows the linear fit of Number of Presses
onto stimulus difficulty, and the color bar the counts of Number of Presses for each
bin.
On Hesitation and Commitment 119
4 A sequential decision making task for studying temporally extended actions
Trajectory Length vs Experienced Difficulty






























- =  -3.04p<0.001
Figure 4.12: Number of presses increase with increasing difficulty of the experi-
enced stimulus (3.23 −→ 0). 2280 trials collapsed across all 4 subjects. Black dots
show mean Number of Presses for each difficulty bin, red line shows the linear
fit of Number of Presses onto stimulus difficulty, and the color bar the counts of
Number of Presses for each bin.
4.4.4.2 Inter-press Interval Reliability
We observed that across subjects, the dristribution of inter-press-intervals
(IPI) was very similar, and peak IPIs were almost overlaping.
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Figure 4.13: Each row shows one subject’s distributions of inter-press intervals
(IPI) for all responses. Red line shows the peak IPI.
Furthermore, we observed this pattern for all subjects and for all differ-
ent difficulty conditions, inter-press interval distributions are concentrated
around a peak of <200 ms. We initially thought this observation suggested
that subjects were always in one of three states: waiting, press and continue
pressing left, or press and continue pressing right.
However, upon further inspection, we noticed that for harder trials,
longer IPIs were present shifting the 95 percentile of the distribution to-
wards higher values. This suggests a 4th state, uncomitted pressing.
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Figure 4.14: Inter-press-interval (IPI) distributions for all subjects (each column)
across 6 different difficulty conditions (each row). Red line marks the peak, ma-
genta line marks the 95th percentile.
Comparing the IPI to stimulus difficulty allows us to see that in fact,
IPIs decrease with decreasing trial difficulty.
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Inter-Press-Interval vs Experienced Difficulty
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Figure 4.15: Across all 4 subjects inter-press-interval (IPI) decreases with decreas-
ing difficulty of the experienced stimulus (3.23 −→ 1). Black dots show mean IPI
for each difficulty bin, red line shows the linear fit of IPI onto stimulus difficulty,
and the color bar the counts of IPI for each bin.
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Inter-Press-Interval vs Experienced Difficulty


































- =  -0.05p<0.001
Figure 4.16: Inter-press-interval decreases with decreasing difficulty of the expe-
rienced stimulus (3.23 −→ 1). 2280 trials collapsed across all 4 subjects. Black
dots show mean IPI for each difficulty bin, red line shows the linear fit of IPI onto
stimulus difficulty, and the color bar the counts of IPI for each bin.
No differences in the above pattern were observed when analyzing correct
and incorrect trials separately (not shown).
In order to assess whether in addition to the action states 1) pressing at
or near peak IPI to the left 2) pressing at or near peak IPI to the right, and
3) waiting, there is a fourth state, we repeat this analysis removing any IPI
values greater than 0.5 seconds, arbitrarily chosen as a threshold for waiting
since it is more than 2x longer than the peak IPI but not so long that the
analysis is a pointless repeat of (Figure 4.16). We find that the regression
coefficient relating IPI to difficulty is virtually unchanged by the removal of
waiting. We thus conclude that subjects have a fourth action state, hesitant
pressing depending on the stimulus mean.
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Inter-Press-Interval vs Experienced Difficulty
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Figure 4.17: Even after the removal of any IPIs > 0.5 seconds, inter-press-interval
decreases with decreasing difficulty of the experienced stimulus (3.23 −→ 1). 2280
trials collapsed across all 4 subjects. Black dots show mean IPI for each difficulty
bin, red line shows the linear fit of IPI onto stimulus difficulty, and the color bar
the counts of IPI for each bin.
In light of the modeling result that agents become more committed as
time passes, we wondered whether the pattern of IPIs could show a time
dependence (note that the model does not have varying IPIs). In order to
assess the time dependence of IPIs, we analyze them as a function of the
time when they occurred in the trial. Regression analysis shows a small
tendency for longer trials to have slightly shorter IPIs. The effect is small,
but significant for 3 of the 4 subjects (Figure 4.19) This is the first hint
of a time dependence in the action space of the subjects - beyond reaction
time itself - in this task. This is meaningful because our normative model
becomes more committed as time progresses in a trial, and we expect some
signature(s) of this in subject behavior.
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Inter-Press-Interva vs. Time
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Figure 4.18: For 3 of 4 subjects, inter-press-interval decreases with increasing
duration in the trial. Black dots show mean IPI for each difficulty bin, red line
shows the linear fit of IPI onto stimulus difficulty, and the color bar the counts of
IPI for each bin.
Inter-Press-Interva vs. Time
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Figure 4.19: Inter-press-interval decreases with increasing duration in the trials.
The effect is very small but significant for 2880 trials across 4 subjects. Black
dots show mean IPI for each difficulty bin, red line shows the linear fit of IPI onto
stimulus difficulty, and the color bar the counts of IPI for each bin.
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4.4.4.3 Trajectory Reliability
In order to abstract the apparent reliability of responses to repeats of the
same stimulus (Figure 4.3) into a summary statistic, we compute pairwise
correlations between trajectories elicited by stimulus repeats vs trajectories
elicited by stimuli sampled from the same difficulty condition. For each of
90 unique stimuli, we produce such a matrix, sorting it such that the first 8
elements correspond to the repeats of the same stimulus, and elements 8-16
show the randomly chosen stimuli sampled from the exact same difficulty
condition, p(r). A sample matrix can be seen in (Figure 4.20), and 2 more
in (Figure 4.21). For statistical analysis of these matrices see (Figure 4.22).
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Correlation
Figure 4.20: Left panel shows 8 responses to repeats of the same stimulus in red,
and 8 responses randomly chosen from the 112 responses to the other 14 unique
stimuli with the same difficulty condition, p(R), in black (note that these other
112 responses contain 8 repeats of each of the other 14 stimuli with the same
condition). Right panel shows the pairwise correlations of the responses shown on
the corresponding left panel. Colorbar is the correlation. The matrix is sorted such
that the first 8 elements correspond to responses of repeats of the same stimulus,
and elements 9-16 show responses to randomly chosen stimuli sampled from the
exact same difficulty condition, p(r).
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Figure 4.21: Each left panel shows 8 responses to repeats of the same stimulus
in red, and 8 responses randomly chosen from the 112 responses to the other 14
unique stimuli with the same difficulty condition, p(R), in black (note that these
other 112 responses contain 8 repeats of each of the other 14 stimuli with the
same condition). Each right panel shows the pairwise correlations of the responses
shown on the corresponding left panel. Colorbar is the correlation. The matrices
are sorted such that the first 8 elements correspond to responses of repeats of
the same stimulus, and elements 8-16 show responses to randomly chosen stimuli
sampled from the exact same difficulty condition, p(r).
The correlations observed for repeats vs same p observed in (Figure 4.20)
are analyzed in detail and as a function of the difficulty of the stimulus below
(Figure 4.22).
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- =  1.22p<0.001
Figure 4.22: For all 4 subjects, difference between the mean of the same-stimulus
correlations sub-matrix and the mean of the same-condition correlations sub-
matrix depends on the difficulty of the stimulus. For each unique stimulus matrix
of correlations A, we create 2 sub-matrices, one of the correlations between the
responses to repeats, Repeats = A(1:8, 18), and one of the correlations between
each unique repeat response and the 8 same p(R) condition responses, Same Con-
ditions = A(1:8, 9:16). We eliminate identity and duplicate entries from the
Repeats sub-matrix by further sub-sampling only the upper triangular matrix. Fi-
nally, we subtract the mean of the Same Conditions sub-matrix from the mean of
the Repeats sub-matrix and find that this difference depends on the difficulty of
the stimulus. Cyan (magenta) line shows the linear regression of the difference
between the mean repeats correlations and the mean same conditions correlation
onto the stimulus strength for leftward (rightward) trials.
As an alternative analysis, we average all 90 matrices for each subject. A
clear difference between the correlations between repeats vs same condition
stimuli can be seen (Figure 4.23).
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Figure 4.23: For each subject, an average correlations matrix is computed by
averaging all 90 pairwise correlations matrices comparing responses to stimulus
repeats to responses of stimuli sampled from the same condition. Matrices are
sorted such that the first 8 elements correspond to responses of repeats of the same
stimulus, and elements 9-16 show responses to randomly chosen stimuli sampled
from the exact same difficulty condition, p(r).
Statistical comparisons at the level of the average matrices (Figure 4.23)
is performed via Monte-Carlo Simulations. We apply a similar sub-set pro-
cedure to the average matrices as that followed in (Figure 4.22). The goal
is to compare the mean of a sub-matrix of average correlations between re-
peated stimuli, T-stat, to the mean of a sub-matrix of average correlations
between each unique repeat and 8 stimuli sampled from the same condition.
We repeat this procedure 1000 times in order to generate a distribution of
surrogate mean average correlations to same-condition stimuli, which can
be used to compute the probability of observing T-stat by chance. Each
subject’s average matrix of correlations (Figure 4.23), B, is subset to cre-
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ate 2 sub-matrices, one of the average correlations between the responses
to repeats, Repeats = B(1:8, 18), and one of the average correlations of all
the unique repeat response and the 8 same p(R) condition responses, Same
Conditions = B(1:8, 9:16). We eliminate identity and duplicate entries from
the Repeats sub-matrix by further sub-sampling only the upper triangular
matrix. We statistically compare the value of the mean of Repeats, our test
statistic, to that of 1000 surrogate values of the mean of Same Conditions
and observe a significant difference for all subjects (p<0.001 bootstrapping
test).
These analysis continue to give significant results when collapsing the
data across all 4 subjects.
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Figure 4.24: The difference between the mean of the same-stimulus correlations
sub-matrix and the mean of the same-condition correlations sub-matrix depends on
the difficulty of the stimulus, data collapsed across 4 subjects. Cyan (magenta) line
shows the linear regression of the difference between the mean repeats correlations
and the mean same conditions correlation onto the stimulus strength for leftward
(rightward) trials.
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Figure 4.25: Average correlations matrix is computed by averaging all 90 pairwise
correlations matrices comparing responses to stimulus repeats to responses of stim-
uli sampled from the same condition, collapsed across all 4 subjects. Matrices are
sorted such that the first 32 elements correspond to responses of repeats of the same
stimulus, and elements 33-64 show responses to randomly chosen stimuli sampled
from the exact same difficulty condition, p(r). The difference between the mean
of the same-stimulus correlations sub-matrix and the mean of the same-condition
correlations sub-matrix is significant for all subjects (p<0.001 bootstrapping test).
4.4.4.4 Commitment: Space-time dependence of Actions
For our final set of analysis, we try to show the dependence of the action
space of the subjects on their position in the arena and time in the task.
From our pilot disembodied experiment (Figure 4.1), we know that in a stan-
dard 2AFC configuration the subjects integrate our stimulus in time. In the
embodied task, our model from Chapter 3 suggests that as the bounds on
evidence narrow in time and collapse in the direction of the agent’s move-
ment, agents become less tuned to the stimulus and their probabilities of
waiting become smaller while the probabilities of pressing increase towards
the side the agent of the arena the agent is in. Thus, we try to empirically
calculate p(L,W,R|E), the probabilities of making a left movement, waiting,
or making a right movement given the accumulated evidence the subjects
have heard at 5 different position intervals in the arena and 3 different time
intervals. Evidence is defined as in (3.3.4.3) over a window or time spanning
N samples in the past, but excluding the last M samples, since in humans
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we expect a delay in processing the stimuli to guide actions. Start times for
the task are around 0.5-1 seconds, suggesting M is between 2 and 4. N<5
often did not produce complete histograms, and N between 5 and 8 tend to
produce similar results. For some N and M parameter combinations, occa-
sionally the evidence 3.3.4.3 does not span all the bins in the axis (see white
space in the center bottom row histogram for subject 3 (Figure 4.28) and
subject 4 (Figure 4.29).
Figure 4.26: P(L,W,R|E) at different locations and time intervals in the arena
for subject 1. For each row, the leftmost (rightmost) plots represent the leftmost
(rightmost) spaces in the arena, and the center plot is the center of the arena.
Time is split from 0 to 2 seconds (top row), 2 to 4 seconds (middle row), and
4 to 7 seconds (bottom row). At each time step, we count the number of times
the subject waited, moved left, or moved right within the next 0.25 seconds, given
how much evidence the subject has experienced. Evidence is defined as 3.3.4.3
over the last N samples, excluding the latest M to account for the delay between
experiencing a stimulus and making a deliberate press. Results are shown for N
= 7 and M = 3.
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Figure 4.27: P(L,W,R|E) at different locations and time intervals in the arena
for subject 2. For each row, the leftmost (rightmost) plots represent the leftmost
(rightmost) spaces in the arena, and the center plot is the center of the arena.
Time is split from 0 to 2 seconds (top row), 2 to 4 seconds (middle row), and
4 to 7 seconds (bottom row). At each time step, we count the number of times
the subject waited, moved left, or moved right within the next 0.25 seconds, given
how much evidence the subject has experienced. Evidence is defined as 3.3.4.3
over the last N samples, excluding the latest M to account for the delay between
experiencing a stimulus and making a deliberate press. Results are shown for N
= 7 and M = 3.
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Figure 4.28: P(L,W,R|E) at different locations and time intervals in the arena
for subject 3. For each row, the leftmost (rightmost) plots represent the leftmost
(rightmost) spaces in the arena, and the center plot is the center of the arena.
Time is split from 0 to 2 seconds (top row), 2 to 4 seconds (middle row), and
4 to 7 seconds (bottom row). At each time step, we count the number of times
the subject waited, moved left, or moved right within the next 0.25 seconds, given
how much evidence the subject has experienced. Evidence is defined as 3.3.4.3
over the last N samples, excluding the latest M to account for the delay between
experiencing a stimulus and making a deliberate press. Results are shown for N
= 7 and M = 3.
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Figure 4.29: P(L,W,R|E) at different locations and time intervals in the arena
for subject 4. For each row, the leftmost (rightmost) plots represent the leftmost
(rightmost) spaces in the arena, and the center plot is the center of the arena.
Time is split from 0 to 2 seconds (top row), 2 to 4 seconds (middle row), and
4 to 7 seconds (bottom row). At each time step, we count the number of times
the subject waited, moved left, or moved right within the next 0.25 seconds, given
how much evidence the subject has experienced. Evidence is defined as 3.3.4.3
over the last N samples, excluding the latest M to account for the delay between
experiencing a stimulus and making a deliberate press. Results are shown for N
= 7 and M = 3.
We observe that P(L,W,R|E) changes as subjects move in the arena,
shifting from waiting to pressing towards the side of the arena the subject is
in. Focusing on one row of panels and moving across the columns changes
the maximum of P(L,W,R|E), shifting it towards the side that the subject is
in. This pattern gets stronger as time advances in the task (going down the
rows of panels), and waiting tends to disappear in favor of pressing towards
the side of the arena the subject is in, largely disregarding the stimulus in
the last row.
However, it is possible that ’inertia’ or a tendency to keep pressing in the
direction where the subject has been pressing recently, could, in principle,
completely account for this effect. In order to reject this hypothesis, one
possibility would be to constrain P(L,W,R|E) conditional on a subject’s
history of pressing being the same. However, we do not have enough data for
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such an analysis. In lieu, we look for instances where subjects have not been
pressing for some time. We set this minimum refractory period preceding
an action to 0.2 seconds, since this quantity is just bigger than the peak
inter-press-interval across all subjects (Figure 4.13). With this constraint, it
no longer is possible to compute the histogram of P(L,W,R|E) at different
locations and time for each subject, but given the similarity of responses
(Figure 4.25) and the histograms computed in (Figure 4.26, 4.27, 4.28, and
4.29) we collapsed the data across all subjects and compute P(L,W,R|E) as
before but with the minimum 0.2 second refractory period preceding actions
constraint.
In (Figure 4.30) we attempt to investigate separately the effect of time
passing and of moving in the arena on the subjects’ P(L,W,R|E). In each
panel, the y axis represents from top to bottom: Pressing Right, Waiting,
and Pressing Left. The x axis represents evidence (which goes from -1 for
left to +1 for right), which we define as the mean of the stimulus for the
window specified by parameters the history (N) and exclude (M) previously
defined. Each column of panels represents a restricted range of positions in
the arena ordered from leftmost to rightmost accordingly. Time intervals
advance going down the rows of panels. First to explore the effect of time,
we focus on the top row center panel, and observe what happens as we go
down the rows of panels. The top row (early in the trial) has a lot of waiting
across all evidence values, with maximum waiting at 0 evidence. There are
a few responses to the right and left sides, which depend on the evidence,
occurring mainly at 1 for right, and at -1 for left. As we move down rows of
panels, waiting gets more faint, and disappears for the bottom row. In the
last row, waiting is nearly completely replaced by pressing to the Right and
to the left. The same observation of waiting decreasing and disappearing by
the last row is seen at the off-center columns, with the notable change that
the side of pressing that replaces waiting is the same as the side of the arena.
We then focus on spatial signatures of commitment by focusing on one row of
panels at a time and moving across the columns. For all rows, moving across
the panels of columns shows us that space too has the effect of committing
the subjects towards the side that they are in. The pattern is much stronger
for the last row than for the first row, showing the interaction of space and
time in generating the positive feedback that we call commitment.
We cannot differentiate the spatial vs the temporal dependence of com-
mitment from this analysis, however, we in the next section we investigate
On Hesitation and Commitment 137
4 A sequential decision making task for studying temporally extended actions
whether time and space dependant bounds are necessary to observe com-
mitment as described in this section.
This analysis also gives us insight about the biases of the subjects. For
the center column, one would expect equal probabilities of left and right
responses from an unbiased subject, however our super subject has a slight
left side bias. This was expected as subjects 3 and 4 have strong biases to
the left (Figure 4.28) and right (Figure 4.29) respectively, which appear to
cancel each other out. However, subject 1 appears to have a left bias (Figure
4.26) smaller than those of subject 3 and 4, but larger than subject 2’s slight
right bias (Figure 4.27). For the super subject, equal probabilities of left
and right occur for the first right side positions. The psychometrics from 3
subjects show a small left stimulus response bias, and the other has a small
right side bias (Figure 4.7), which result in a small left side bias for the
average psychometric (Figure 4.8). The shifted psychometric suggests the
left side bias observed in the action space histogram for the super subject
(Figure 4.30) is a sensory bias, but there remains the possibility that this
bias is a motor bias resulting from it being on average easier to press left
than right for our subjects.
The commitment effect of time and space are observable in our sub-
jects’ behavior, even after considering only responses to have a minimum
200 millisecond refractory period preceding them. The fact that the precise
inter-press-interval is tuned to the difficulty of the stimulus (Figure 4.17) is
evidence that the actions we observe in the arena are mindful sequences of
mini-decisions. These histograms are evidence that time and space affect
the sequences of mini-decisions, ultimately biasing the overall categorical
choice being made. In the final sections we show preliminary work investi-
gating whether the feedback loops observed in the subjects are caused by
the time and space costs in our agent’s value function (3.3.3). Alternatively,
the statistics of the stimulus could be the origin of the positive feedback.
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Figure 4.30: P(L,W,R|E) at different locations and time intervals in the arena for
all subjects collapsed, with a minimum refractory period of 0.2 seconds between
unique presses. For each row, the leftmost (rightmost) plots represent the leftmost
(rightmost) spaces in the arena, and the center plot is the center of the arena.
Time is split from 0 to 2 seconds (top row), 2 to 4 seconds (middle row), and
4 to 7 seconds (bottom row). At each time step, we count the number of times
the subject waited, moved left, or moved right within the next 0.25 seconds, given
how much evidence the subject has experienced. Evidence is defined as 3.3.4.3
over the last N samples, excluding the latest M to account for the delay between
experiencing a stimulus and making a deliberate press. Results are shown for N
= 7 and M = 3.
4.4.4.5 Commitment in the Optimal Agent
In this and the next section, we next conduct the same type of analysis as
in (Figure 4.30) of the probabilities of pressing left, waiting, and pressing
right for the optimal agent and a null model with constant decision bounds
at all times and spaces in order to investigate the origin of the signature
of commitment. We show that this commitment is, not surprisingly, also
observed in the optimal model at the level of behavior. In chapter 3, we
inferred some properties about the action space of an optimal RL agent by
studying her value function. For example, we were able to abstract decision
bounds for the agent at every space and time in the arena, and show that
these bounds widen as the cost of time passing is relaxed (equivalent to
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longer arenas), and terminate earlier the wider the arena size (fatter arenas).
The optimal agent has a commitment policy by construction, since time and
movement costs are imposed in the agent’s value function, and these control
the spatial and time properties of the decision bounds (Figure 3.18 and 3.23).
The analysis is as in the subjects’ analysis (Figure 4.30). However, in
the model analysis the constraint that the agent has not moved for a certain
number of intervals is removed. Note that this was chosen to be 200 ms in
the subject data analysis (smaller than the peak inter-press-intervals (Fig-
ure 4.13), and is also smaller than the 250 ms step size, so this constraint
would bear zero effect on this analysis for the model. We set a window of 4
samples to match the window used for the subjects, however setting N to the
maximum value of 28 does not qualitatively change the plots, likely because
the agent has a perfect memory. The exclude parameter is set to 0 since
the agent immediately perceives and integrates the stimulus. We simulated
30,000 trials for this analysis.
We see a similar pattern as in the subject behavior (Figure 4.30), for
each column of panels (region of space) we can see that going down the rows
(advancing in time) shifts the distribution of actions from waiting (within
each panel, the middle row) to pressing left or right according to the side
that the agent finds herself in (left for the leftmost panels, and right for
the rightmost panels). This shows that there is a time dependency in the
action space of the agent in response to the stimulus, as we expected from
the decision bounds. Likewise, focusing on one row and moving down the
columns we can see a shift in the probability of pressing from left to right, as
the agent moves from left to right positions in the arena. Unlike the subjects,
the super subject, the agent is not biased, best observed for the last row,
center panel. We believe that the pattern of commitment in time observed
in the subject data (Figure 4.30) and in the normative agent (Figure 4.31)
is due to the costs of time (explicit in both the task and the model) and
the cost of moving (implicit in the task from the geometry and the time it
takes to move, explicit at each time-step in the model). In order to test this
hypothesis, in the last results section (Figure 4.32 and 4.33), we begin to
explore simpler null policies to generate behavior, such as flat bounds that
do not change with time nor with location.
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Figure 4.31: P(L,W,R|E) at different locations and time intervals in the arena
for 30k simulated trials of the optimal RL agent. For each row, the leftmost
(rightmost) plots represent the leftmost (rightmost) spaces in the arena, and the
center plot is the center of the arena. Time is split from 0 to 2 seconds (top row), 2
to 4 seconds (middle row), and 4 to 7 seconds (bottom row). At each time step, we
count the number of times the subject waited, moved left, or moved right within the
next 0.25 seconds, given how much evidence the subject has experienced. Evidence
is defined as 3.3.4.3 over the last N samples, excluding the latest M to account for
the delay between experiencing a stimulus and making a deliberate press. Results
are shown for N = 4 and M = 0, since the agent has perfect memory.
4.4.4.6 Flat decision bounds reproduce some but not all the sig-
natures of commitment
In order to test whether the time and space dependent decision bounds of our
optimal agent are necessary to produce the phenomenology of commitment
towards the side the agent is already in, we simulate the exact same optimal
agent as in (Figure 4.31) and use the bounds she encounters at the 3rd
(18th) time step as an example of a wide (narrow) decision bound. We fix
this constant bound at all times and positions to create a null model where
we can observe the amount of commitment that arises naturally in our task
as a consequence of guiding an agent with a stochastic stimulus, without the
explicit specification of a cost on time or movement.
In order to argue that neither wide flat bounds (Figure 4.32) nor nar-
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row flat bounds (Figure 4.33) produce the strong time dependent shifts in
P(L,W,R|E). We find it useful to separate the discussion of "space depen-
dence" of the probabilities from "time dependence", although these concepts
may not actually have differential effects. In what concerns time, in some
columns - see outermost columns of (Figure 4.32 and 4.33) for example -
there in fact appears to be an increase in the probability of waiting as time
goes by (moving down rows of panels), which is the exact opposite of what
we observed in the subjects (Figure 4.30) and in the optimal agent (Figure
4.31). Regarding space dependence, there are some differences as a func-
tion of the position the agent is in that depend on the width of the bounds.
For the wide flat bounds (Figure 4.32), the decrease in the probabilities of
waiting as one moves from the center panel to the 2nd and 4th columns
and as one moves from columns 2 and 4 to columns 1 and 5, respectively is
much lower than for the subjects (Figure 4.30). For the narrow flat bounds
(Figure 4.33), we have overall even less space-dependence of the probabili-
ties. Since the bounds are narrow and it is therefore easy to cross bounds
to either side, the probability of waiting is low everywhere. This attenuates
any space dependent differences that could possibly exist. The space depen-
dent differences that remain clear (i.e. in the top row, comparing the two
extreme columns with the three middle positions) are clearly not dependant
on the space and movement costs. Since the observable differences between
the optimal and flat bound policies at the level of behavior may be quantita-
tively small, it may be fruitful to quantify the actual differences between the
P(L,W,R|E) for the different policies. Visual inspection suggests removing
the time and space dependence of the decision bounds leads to a decrease
in commitment behavior.
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Figure 4.32: P(L,W,R|E) at different locations and time intervals in the arena for
30k simulated trials of an agent with wide flat action bounds that do not change
in space nor time. For each row, the leftmost (rightmost) plots represent the
leftmost (rightmost) spaces in the arena, and the center plot is the center of the
arena. Time is split from 0 to 2 seconds (top row), 2 to 4 seconds (middle row),
and 4 to 7 seconds (bottom row). At each time step, we count the number of times
the subject waited, moved left, or moved right within the next 0.25 seconds, given
how much evidence the subject has experienced. Evidence is defined as 3.3.4.3
over the last N samples, excluding the latest M to account for the delay between
experiencing a stimulus and making a deliberate press. Results are shown for N =
4 and M = 0, since the agent has perfect memory. We set a window of 4 samples to
match the window used for the subjects, however setting N to the maximum value
of 28 does not qualitatively change the plots. We simulated 30,000 trials with
bound height comparable to the bounds observed by the optimal agent of (Figure
4.31) at the 3rd time-step in the center of the arena.
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Figure 4.33: P(L,W,R|E) at different locations and time intervals in the arena
for 30k simulated trials of an agent with narrow flat action bounds that do not
change in space nor time. For each row, the leftmost (rightmost) plots represent
the leftmost (rightmost) spaces in the arena, and the center plot is the center of the
arena. Time is split from 0 to 2 seconds (top row), 2 to 4 seconds (middle row),
and 4 to 7 seconds (bottom row). At each time step, we count the number of times
the subject waited, moved left, or moved right within the next 0.25 seconds, given
how much evidence the subject has experienced. Evidence is defined as 3.3.4.3
over the last N samples, excluding the latest M to account for the delay between
experiencing a stimulus and making a deliberate press. Results are shown for N =
4 and M = 0, since the agent has perfect memory. We set a window of 4 samples to
match the window used for the subjects, however setting N to the maximum value
of 28 does not qualitatively change the plots. We simulated 30,000 trials with
bound height comparable to the bounds observed by the optimal agent of (Figure
4.31) at the 18th time-step in the center of the arena.
Regardless of whether the bound applied is wide (Figure 4.32) or narrow
(Figure 4.33), even late into the trial the agent continues to wait and move
in the opposite direction than the target it is closest to. Critically, both of
these behaviors are reduced as time advances in the subject data and in the
optimal RL agent. The future steps for this work will involve quantifying
the degree to which these probabilities differ.
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4.5 Discussion
In this chapter we managed to capture hesitant choice behavior by extend-
ing a standard 2AFC task to a 2D arena that must be traversed in order to
report a binary choice. Recent studies are similarly beginning to analyze be-
havioral data during the execution of a task, intuiting that it is a meaningful
part of the cognitive cost function [Spivey et al., 2005, Resulaj et al., 2009,
Haith et al., 2015, Selen et al., 2012, Wong and Haith, 2017]. The nature of
the questions posed by [Haith et al., 2015] and their approach is strikingly
close to our study. They investigate experimentally the range of distances
between targets for which in-between trajectories occur in a ’go-before-you-
know’ task, and then model a normative agent that captures the dependence
of in-between trajectories on the geometric cost imposed. The authors ex-
plicitly say that their objective was not to fit the data to a model, but to show
that a normative model with explicit goals that depend not only on stimulus
probabilities, but also on motor constraints from the environment could pro-
duce human-like behavior, suggesting such trajectories may not be errors due
to competing motor plans, but rather deliberate actions for dealing with an
uncertain world [Haith et al., 2015, Wong and Haith, 2017]. We go further
in suggesting that in-between movements are deliberate, and provide several
pieces of evidence that intermediate actions are deliberate, and dependant on
the temporal characteristics of the stimulus nearly on a moment-to-moment
basis (Figure 4.3, 4.22, and 4.25). The overall results suggest that the im-
mediate next action of subjects is significantly linearly correlated with the
count of the stimulus at the previous time-step, and that this correlation is
strongest at the beginning of the trial. We found it important to use a time-
varying stimulus, as it allowed others to make inferences about the time de-
pendence of choice behavior on the stimulus [Nienborg and Cumming, 2007,
Brunton et al., 2013]. We were inspired early on by a study that used time-
varying visual stimuli to assess via psychophysical reverse-correlation which
periods were most informative to choices for which the mean stimulus signal
was weak [Nienborg and Cumming, 2007]. Drawing from all of our experi-
ence across 3 experiments and the normative model we form some conclu-
sions. In both cases, the not fully committed state of the agent or subject
must be in a sweet spot of time urgency and movement compatibility. Hes-
itation behavior defined as the Actual Number of Presses divided by the
Minimum Required Number of Presses is seen to be maximum in the model
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for arenas that are smaller than 20 grids, and conversely the cost of time
cannot be too small (Figure 3.24). In experiment 1, we didn’t have any time
limits beyond the maximum time allowed of 8 seconds. This put subjects
in the regime where waiting until one is fully certain to act is the most
advantageous thing to do, and so only a few hesitant decision trajectories
were captured. While we managed to put subjects in Experiment 2 in a
regime of higher cost of time, similar as [Haith et al., 2015] we didn’t have
a precise grip on this tie urgency, and our space state representation is a
gross simplification of the motor component in the human task. The grid
world allowed us to explore regimes of geometric cost for the human task in
comparable terms to the model. Pilot experiments were used to optimise for
the arena size to 8 steps to each side (17x) and 7 seconds time limit, with
points being lost linearly from 100 to 0 in that time. This resulted in behav-
ior qualitatively similar to what we saw in the model, where we understand
the reason why similar stimuli result in similar trajectories. However, this
similarity is difficult to show in the human data. We analyzed the behavior
of the subjects depending on their position in the arena, and found signa-
tures of commitment suggested by the model. It is also possible to make
such plots for the model, which not surprisingly show the same commitment
patterns. In order to test if the pattern of commitment in time observed
in the subject data (Figure 4.30) and in the normative agent (Figure 4.31)
is caused by the costs of time and the cost of moving, we began to explore
simpler null policies to generate behavior, such as flat decision bounds that
are the same at all times and positions. Preliminary results suggest that
commitment, as described in the last sections, is not fully dependant on the
time and movement costs (Figure 4.31), since some of the signatures of com-
mitment we observed in the optimal agent are also present for both the wide
bounds (Figure 4.32) as well as for narrow bounds (Figure 4.33), however
not as pronounced. To observe spatial effects of commitment, we focus on
one row at a time and can see that P(L,W,R|E) changes for the flat bound
models as we move across columns (positions in the arena), even if these
changes are not as strong as in the optimal model or the subject data. In
contrast, the behavior of the flat models with respect to time (moving down
the rows of panels) clearly is different to the optimal agent (Figure 4.31) and
the subjects (Figure 4.30). Unlike the subjects or the optimal model, the
flat bound model continues to wait or even waits more late into the trials
for both the wide bounds (Figure 4.32) as well as for narrow bounds (Figure
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4.33). A quantification of the degree to which P(L,W,R|E) changes in the
optimal policy relative to the flat bounds policy might reveal more about
the dependence of this change on the time and movement costs, or whether
this decrease is due to the behavior of the belief function on the stimulus
itself. One could explore the dependence of commitment on the stimulus by
constraining P(L,W,R) on the value of belief (which is what directly makes
the flat bounds agent move) instead of the evidence. In the top row of all
the models (flat and optimal), we see a bias for continuing to go in the same
direction when the agent is located in the more extreme positions (columns
1 vs 5). This can be seen as a form of confirmation bias, but unlike the
confirmation bias that arises in active sensing, where the observations that
follow are affected by the organismâĂŹs actions, actions do not alter the
time-course of our stimulus. However, part of the commitment is still ex-
pected, because it reflects that stimuli have some signal which is maintained
through the stimulus. However, this doesn’t explain the commitment we
observe fully, since we are constraining these histograms on a range of ev-
idence. One might be able to factor the expected bias of the stimulus by
constraining on the exact belief path. This analysis is likely only testable
in our simulated agents due to the large amount of data such a test would
require.
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• In this chapter we summarize all of our results and discuss
them in the context of the decision-making literature.
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5.1 Final Discussion
We introduced a novel psychophysics task in order to measure behavior
during the deliberation period of a binary choice task. Similar methods
had been used previously to investigate decision making processes from mo-
tor output [Spivey et al., 2005, Resulaj et al., 2009, Selen et al., 2012], how-
ever these investigations used either very simple stimuli [Spivey et al., 2005],
or extinguished the stimulus when movements began [Resulaj et al., 2009,
Selen et al., 2012]. Our investigation was unique in that we captured motor
output while subjects experienced a stochastic, time-varying stimulus.
Our novel experiments allowed us to capture in-between trajectories in a
fraction of the hard trials of Experiment 1 (Figure 2.7), however, this phe-
nomenology happened too few times to statistically assess its connection to
the stimulus. In order to increase the number of trajectories per experiment,
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we imposed a strict time limit of half a second to initiate movements. Similar
constraints were utilized in previous investigations of the in-between move-
ments [Resulaj et al., 2009, Hanks et al., 2015]. This modification resulted
in a lot more complex trajectories per experimental session (Figure 2.15 and
2.17). This phenomenology can be abstracted to a simple summary statis-
tic, the trajectory length, which increases for all subjects as the difficulty
of the stimulus increases (Figure 2.9 and 2.18). That the in-between tra-
jectories occur for more difficult stimuli had been previously described by
[Spivey et al., 2005], also using auditory stimuli (words). We characterize
this phenomenon more thoroughly by systematically testing different stim-
ulus difficulties dynamically varying the mean inter-aural level difference of
white noise stimuli delivered via headphones. The key point that experiment
2 data allowed us to make is that for difficult trials, it is possible to train a
ridge regression model to reconstruct the noisy stimulus sequences from lin-
ear combinations of eye and hand data (Figure 2.21 and 2.22). Above chance
correlation between the reconstructions and the true trajectories is observed
on hold-out cross-validation data. This is empirical evidence that the on-
line trajectories hold information about temporal features of the stochastic
stimulus (Figure 2.22 and 2.23), however it remained difficult to describe
the exact role of the stimulus in guiding subject movements.
One hypothesis is that our hesitant trajectories were motor errors result-
ing from competing motor plans [Haith et al., 2015], but this theory would
explain only erroneous movement initiation, whereas we sometimes observe
several corrections within a single trial. Subjects appear to be handling the
sequential sampling problem, partly, by making sequences of mini-decisions
along the way. The bounded accumulation of evidence had been expanded
to explain changes of mind, action corrections following an initial movement
towards the wrong target [Resulaj et al., 2009]. It would take 7 more years
for that framework to be generalized to incorporate 2 sequential decisions
[Van Den Berg et al., 2016]. In the interim, the dependence of changes of
mind on motor effort, quantified with force fields as well as varying dis-
tances between targets was demonstrated and modeled as changes to the
change of mind bound (a second bound following the initial decision bound)
[Burk et al., 2014]. This is qualitatively the same result we would obtain
around 2016 by varying arena width in our normative agent, as well as
[Haith et al., 2015] a year earlier.
Prior to our own modeling exercise, the reason why we became inter-
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ested in normative models and reinforcement learning is that it provides
both an output behavior and a theory of why that behavior is generated.
We realized we didn’t have a means of modeling optimal or even reasonable
behavior in our task because we lacked a self consistent task description.
Our subjects were reaching for targets merely because we instructed them
to. In order to know what behavior could be expected in our embodied de-
cision making task, we would have to describe the precise goals of subjects
and agents in the task in terms of rewards, and any relevant environmental
constraints in terms of costs [Sutton and Barto, 2018]. Normative solutions
to the cognitive 2AFC task had been previously studied [Moreno-Bote, 2010,
Drugowitsch et al., 2012]. The framework of [Drugowitsch et al., 2012] used
dynamic programming to estimate the value of each state in a trial by back-
propagating it from known future values of reward. The agent evaluates
the probability of obtaining the rewards using Bayesian statistics, and can
weight the size of that reward, R, by the probability of obtaining it, p(R)R,
against the cost of moving and the cost for waiting to experience more
stimuli and become more certain. The resulting policy imposes optimal col-
lapsing bounds on the accumulated evidence. We generalized this previously
described POMDP framework ([Drugowitsch et al., 2012]) to also include a
geometric cost for approaching distally separated targets in an arena. Our
agent produces hesitant decision trajectories for difficult stimuli (Figure 3.10)
for a specific range of time and movement costs.
Our optimal agent produces similar behavioral summary statistics as we
saw in our first two experiments, namely that the reaction times and the
trajectory lengths increase significantly with increasing stimulus difficulty
(decreasing mean ILD) (Figure 3.10). We characterize the number of presses
and other signatures of behavior (i.e. reaction time, start time, and post-
start waiting) for an agent that must traverse an arena of width 17 (unit
grids) under a range of different time limits (Figure 3.17) and find that
as the cost of time increases, reaction times and start times systematically
decrease and approach their theoretical minimum values. The opposite effect
is observed on hesitation, defined as Number of Presses/Required and post-
start waits, which increase as the cost of time is increased, but also plateau
and appear to decrease from some maximum value around 0.04 cost per unit
time (equivalent to 7 seconds time limit for a unit reward in the disembodied
task). We were able to abstract this behavior to action bounds on the beliefs
of the agent, and observed that the width separating the bounds at each time
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step decreases as the cost of time is increased (Figure 3.18).
Stimulus dependent reaction times due to time collapsing decision bounds
was described for the optimal disembodied agent [Drugowitsch et al., 2012],
and is consistent with our disembodied agent’s behavior as well (Figure 3.5).
However, critically for us these bounds are generally not terminal bounds
until the agent finds herself with just enough time to reach a target. We
call non-terminal action bounds soft decision bounds, and the cost of time
controls the width between them. In general, higher time costs (equivalent
to shorter time limits) create conditions in which less extreme beliefs are
required for the agent to move rather than wait. For very high costs of
time, the action bounds on belief approach chance level (0.5). Fixing the
time limit and instead varying the arena width allowed us to investigate
the effect of arena width on the behavior of the agent (Figure 3.22), and
on the action bounds (Figure 3.23). At the level of behavior, increasing
arena width initially leads to little to no change in the percentage of correct
responses, however, if performance were determined according to the mean
of the experienced stimulus, an initial improvement for small arena widths
(5-11 grids) can be observed (Figure 3.6), meaning the agent is over confi-
dent. Reaction times systematically increase with increasing arena width,
start times initially decrease for arenas smaller than 20 grids in width, but
then plateau before decreasing again for the largest arena sizes. Average
number of presses normalized by arena width initially increases, reaching a
maximum value around width 11, and decreasing slowly with width 21 still
close to the peak. A similar pattern but with lower decay rate can be seen
in post-start waits. The non-monoticity of the signatures of behavior as a
function of time and space highlight the fact that the uncommitted regime
of behavior we have been interested in studying in this thesis requires very
specific environmental settings of time and movement costs (arena sizes).
In order to observe hesitation in an embodied categorical choice, we have
learned that experimental conditions must be precisely fine-tuned. This can
explain why our first experiment did not result in many hesitant decision
trajectories. We were sampling in the asymptotic behavior of the arena
(long), where the agents have a lot of time to become certain before acting.
Experiment 2 had more hesitant decision trajectories, but the drastic reduc-
tion in reaction times and the idiosyncrasy of the decision trajectories made
us suspect that the maximum start time constraint we imposed put sub-
jects in excess of urgency. This regime might be similar to setting the arena
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size too wide. These models’ signatures of behavior (Figure 3.24) gave us a
range of arena sizes to explore in our final psychophysics experiments. Pilot
experiments (not shown) were used to test a range of arena sizes. We found
that already from the first session subjects showed a lot of hesitant behavior
for arena sizes 15, 17, and 19, in line with the modeling results showing
maximum hesitation for these arena sizes (Figure 3.24). We fixed the arena
size at 17 for our final experiment. Very small arena widths (e.g. 5, 7) did
not result in much hesitation in the subjects, but the model still produces
some hesitation. This might be indicative of a motor cost for starting to
move being present in the subjects.
In the optimal agent, at the level of the bounds we observed that in-
creasing the width of the arena shifts the agent’s decision bound collapse
to earlier times. This is a hard bound that determines the final time for
which it is still possible to reach a target before the time limit. Shifting
the hard decision bounds to earlier times by definition commits the agent
to a choice earlier (Figure 3.23). The effect of varying arena size on the
in-between decision trajectories of human subjects had previously been de-
scribed by [Hanks et al., 2015] and a similar effect on the changes of mind
phenomenology had been described by [Burk et al., 2014]. The authors of
[Hanks et al., 2015] in fact modeled the behavior with a reinforcement learn-
ing agent that penalizes movement in a common currency as task rewards,
similar to ours. However, to our knowledge, the sequential nature of the
decision guided actions that affect one another is not explicitly investigated
by any decision making study prior to ours, until the publication in 2016 of
the 2-stage decision study of [Van Den Berg et al., 2016]. Even in considera-
tion of that work [Van Den Berg et al., 2016], our study better captures the
sequential and continuous nature of decision making in both experimental
design and theoretical approach.
Our final human experiment implements a time dependent point system
in order to mimic the time costs in our model, and replaces the joystick con-
trol with button presses, negating the need for modeling high dimensional
aspects of moving an arm. As in our previous tasks and our model, average
trajectory length increases significantly with increasing stimulus difficulty
(decreasing mean ILD) (Figure 4.11 and 4.12). This dependence on the
stimulus difficulty leaks onto finer motor correlates of displacement, such as
the inter-press-interval which decreases as the stimulus becomes easier (Fig-
ure 4.15). That the precise timing of button presses depends on the stimulus
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can be seen in the reliability of the trajectories to repeated presentations of
the same stimulus. Responses to repeated presentations of the same stimu-
lus result in similar responses on different trials, which is true within subject
(Figure 4.23) as well as across subjects (Figure 4.25) and also depends on
the difficulty of the stimulus (Figure 4.22 and 4.24).
While our model explicitly makes a choice at every time step, we do
not think that this is what our human subjects are doing, at least not at
every time-step. We do however believe that the hesitant decisions reflect
sequences of decisions preceding, at least, at every change of direction. Se-
quential decision making typically describes ’a situation where the decision
maker makes successive observations of a process before a final decision is
made’ [Diederich, 2015], which is the situation that standard drift diffusion
provides a solution to. In contrast, our investigation has more in common
with the field of dynamic decision making, which describes a ’situation where
a series of actions must be taken over time to achieve some overall goal; the
actions are interdependent so that later decisions depend on earlier actions;
and the environment changes both spontaneously and as a consequence of
earlier actions, realistic examples include fighting fires, navigational control,
battlefield decisions, medical emergencies, and so on’ [Busemeyer, 2001]. In
these examples, the dependence of future states on past states is typically
by construction (e.g the state of a chess board after a few moves, or the
state of a fire after fighting it from a few angles). The dependence on each
action on the previous is also by construction, but not explicitly. In our
study, the available actions at each time step are identical, as is the way the
stimulus is processed (always Bayesian statistics). The dependence in space
is rather a result of the iterative derivation the past values from expected
future rewards and action costs.
Whereas complex behavior typically arises in dynamic decision making
tasks out of complex interactions with the environment, in our study hesitant
stimulus correlated choice trajectories naturally arise during the deliberation
of simple perceptual stimuli, seemingly out of simple temporal and spatial
constraints. We also highlight that although we are concerned with motor as-
pects of a decision, our investigation is not concerned with the actual control
of the arm. We purposely do not attempt to model the cost of operating bio-
mechanically realistic limbs, which is a difficult problem tackled by optimal
feedback control [McNamee and Wolpert, 2019, Todorov and Jordan, 2002].
Instead, we focus on understanding a more cognitive aspect of control related
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to taking into consideration the geometry of the environment that must be
navigated, and the time that it takes to carry out actions. We reduce the
action space to simple binary actions in order to mitigate the importance
of real bio-mechanical costs in our study. Our simulations show that, for
a range of time and movement cost regimes, hesitant, in-between decision
trajectories are optimal. The model makes a prediction that not only time,
but also space can commit an optimal agent to decide.
We looked for signatures of commitment in subject behavior and find
that P(L,W,R|E), the probability of pressing left, right, or waiting given the
evidence is dependant on the position of the subjects in the arena and time
in the task (Figure 4.30), as well as in the optimal model (Figure 4.31).
In both the subjects and the optimal agent, focusing on the top row
of panels and looking across the columns, we can see that the position of
the subjects (the column) affects P(L,W,R|E), with the outermost columns
having maximum probabilities of any action for presses towards the side
that the subject is on. This pattern is more easily observed as one looks
down the rows of panels. This shows a time dependence on the commitment
phenomenology we describe, suggesting that the effect of time and space on
this form of positive feedback towards the side the agent is interdependent
on time and space. We have looked for these signatures of commitment in
simpler null models of behavior, such as flat decision bounds at all space
and times to investigate if the origin of commitment is due to the time and
space collapsing bounds (Figure 4.32 and 4.33). Our preliminary results
suggest that time related signatures of commitment are not present, or even
reverse in the flat bounds model, however space related signatures are still
observable in the flat bound model.
We introduced a new task and a theoretical framework that extends the
2AFC task by incorporating a spatial navigation component. Our task allows
us to measure a more continuous output of decision behavior in the 2AFC
task, during the deliberation period, revealing an uncommitted behavior
that we call "hesitation". The hesitant decision trajectories occur in our
theoretical framework only for very specific environments (e.g. hesitation is
not seen for very long or very wide arenas). Our first two experiments gave
us a (painful) preview of the finding that hesitation only occurs for finely
tuned environmental parameters.
We believe that our consideration of extended actions as opposed to a
single, binary event is critical to understand the nature of commitment. We
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found evidence that commitment is not actually all or nothing, but that an
uncommitted state can be observed in situations requiring agents to navigate
an environment to report a binary choice. However, the hesitant trajectories
we observed are rare. In fact we learned that hesitant behavior only occurs
for specific parameters of arena width and arena height (time limit). We de-
veloped a task and a theoretical framework where we can control the factors
affecting extended decisions (time and space). This control over the urgency
to act was critical to find the hesitant regime. Although computing the op-
timal policies is a difficult endeavour, we find that the behavior generated
by our simulated agents allows us to further study the origins of hesitation.
For example, we can compare the hesitation in the optimal agent (which is
under our control), to that in the subjects (which is to some degree under
our control), to, for example, the behavior of agents lacking any change in
their decision bounds (flat bounds). Some limitations of our optimal agents,
aside from the effort to model them, are that tens of thousands of trials are
needed to produce informative plots, and validating such work in human
subjects may thus be impossible. Furthermore, there are some discrepan-
cies between the mode of pressing in the subjects compared to the agents.
For example, for very small arenas subjects do not engage in hesitant be-
havior (pilot experiments not shown), whereas the agent hesitates even for
small arenas. Additionally, the subjects have a tendency to continue press-
ing to the same side they are already pressing, which can be so fast (<200
ms inter-press-interval) that it is more likely the result of some motor bias
to continue pressing than due to the type of cognitive commitment we are
studying in the optimal agent. It is very likely that the human subjects
employ completely different, simpler heuristics for solving the task, than
perfect integration of evidence and optimal trade-offs. Furthermore, strate-
gies might differ across subjects. Our final results testing simpler action
policies suggest that to some degree, flat bounded accumulation of evidence
can account for the commitment effects we observed, more so in space than
time. This will be further investigated in the lab, first by quantifying the
amount to which the spatial and temporal signatures of commitment change
by the removal of the spatial and temporal bound collapse.
Taken together, the experimental and theoretical work in this thesis is
a conceptual bridge between the fields of sequential decision making and
dynamic decision making, and is therefore a meaningful contribution to the
broader field of perceptual decision making and to neuroscience.
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